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ABSTRACT
In 1964, the Kennedy Library Corporation proposed siting the
Kennedy Presidential Library on MBTA yards in Cambridge.
Unresolved conflict with local residents drove the Library
Corporation to seek an alternative site. A generation later,
the New England Aquarium tried to obtain a site for a new
facility in the Charlestown Navy Yard. Once again, conflict
with local citizens was key in forcing the Aquarium to seek
a different location, although at another site still within
the Navy Yard.
Each case featured elite, non-profit institutions acting as
developers in an effort to site a facility that many abutting
residents considered an attractive amenity. Despite offers
from the institutions to mitigate and compensate for adverse
impacts, opponents concerned about traffic, historic
preservation, and quality of life issues mounted a successful
campaign against the proposals.
In both cases, citizen review groups were created to
distribute information and present community input. In the
earlier case, that effort was ad hoc and never succeeded in
becoming the central forum for discussion. In Charlestown,
the citizen group was more formally integrated into the review
process, and participants acknowledged its central position.
Some benefits were reaped from this restructuring.
I suggest in this thesis that in both cases other factors
combined to outweigh the positive effects of the review
processes and produce conflict which stopped short of
litigation. These factors derive from internal institutional
incapacities and external constraints on participants. One
significant factor which affected the outcome of the two cases
is the ambivalence of non-profit organizations about playing
the role of developer. As entrepreneurs they face the dilemma
of how to appropriately dedicate their resources to both their
social mission and to institutional growth.
Thesis supervisor: J. Mark Davidson Schuster, Ida and Cecil
Green Career Development Associate Professor of Urban Planning
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INTRODUCTION
THE SITING DILEMMA
From time to time, a society may require certain facilities
which no community wants as a neighbor. Siting these
facilities can lead to difficult questions regarding public
policy, process, and implementation. A government agency
involved in siting often meets local resistance that forces
it to seek a different balance between efficiency and
equity. What costs can a public authority impose on a host
community? Should compensation be offered as an incentive
to the host community to accept the facility? If so, how
much? What process best enables local communities and
authorities to reach agreement concerning these questions?
Although the facility may be widely recognized as necessary
for the general welfare of the whole population, no
community wants to bear the burden of being host to a
prison, a low-level radioactive material dump, or a sewage
waste treatment plant. These facilities have been termed
"locally unwanted land uses" or LULUs. The reaction from
local communities where LULUs are slated to go is often
CHAPTER ONE
termed: NIMBY - "Not In My Backyard."
Over the past several decades, one response to community
resistance has been to involve the public more explicitly in
the process of siting LULUs. Community inclusion is seen as
a fairer and more efficient way to reach an amicable
outcome.
Despite efforts to include the public in the siting process,
however, many cases are still resolved only after a
contentious period of debate and litigation. Two Boston
area cases faced significant community opposition: the
efforts of the Kennedy Library Corporation to build a
presidential library on the MBTA yards in Cambridge's
Harvard Square; and the New England Aquarium's effort to
build a new facility in the Charlestown Navy Yard at Dry
Dock #2.
In these cases, sponsors of the new facilities appeared to
be in an favorable position to obtain their preferred site,
yet each became embroiled in fractious controversy.
Why did events degenerate into confrontation and ill-
feeling? The Library and Aquarium projects clearly are not
archetypical LULUs because plans for the facilities actually
received broad-based political and popular support, much of
it local. Also, each project seemed to present substantial
amenities to the host community. The Kennedy Library
promised to replace an old train yard with park land and
open space near the waterfront. Moreover, sponsors of the
two projects either agreed to mitigate negative impacts or
to offer what appeared to be significant compensation to
residents. The Aquarium offered educational programs, jobs,
and linkage funding for affordable housing; the Library,
programs for local students.
In both cases, the sponsors were powerful non-profit
institutions staffed by well-trained professionals and
managed by influential boards of trustees. Their proposals
were initially greeted with enthusiasm by many residents who
believed the proposed facilities could be attractive to
neighbors., Mechanisms for citizen input were devised and
many participants entered the siting process in a glow of
optimism. At first glance, these cases seem to be ones
where the typical NIMBY frictions would not be present.
Over the course of siting each of these facilities, however,
a small, determined opposition formed which gradually gained
in strength.- Groups conducting citizen review were incapable
of refocusing conflict into productive directions.
Negotiation between proponents and opponents of the
facilities became so paralyzed that the threat of litigation
motivated sponsoring institutions to seek other locations.
Although events in the two cases largely resemble each
other, one important difference was the format for citizen
review. Community input into the siting process of the
Library was ad hoc without a commonly accepted locus for
public dialogue; various participants maneuvered
independently to reach their objectives.
In the siting case of the New England Aquarium fifteen years
later, however, citizen input was more deeply integrated
into the development review process. Mayor Raymond Flynn
committed his administration to a policy of neighborhood
empowerment, in which residents would participate in
determining what kinds of development are appropriate in
their neighborhood and what measures could equitably
mitigate negative impacts or compensate for local costs. To
implement this policy, neighborhood councils sponsor a
straightforward, formal process, acknowledged by all
participants as an important arena for sharing information
and ideas. Considering that the Aquarium offered attractive
amenities, I assumed that such a rational, formalized
process would be more likely to successfully move
participants to an agreeable outcome than the ad hoc process
in the Library case. But the outcome was strikingly similar
to what happened in the Library case a generation earlier.
The outcomes of the two cases are similar in several
respects. First, the cases ended up costing rather than
benefiting most participants: they invested years of time
and emotional and intellectual effort struggling in dispute.
Second, neither institution was able to locate their new
facility at the preferred site. Furthermore, the decision
to locate elsewhere was motivated more from a fear of
litigation than from open and direct bargaining.
And last, a long-term outcome of both cases was the
"demoralization"' cost to opponents and supporters of the
1 Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson,
Facility Siting and Public Opposition (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Company, 1983), p. 80.
facilities. Almost all participants in these cases lost
confidence in their community's capacity to create a fair,
equitable compromise without reliance on threats or
litigation, an indirect but troubling outcome of each case.
Because of their ineffectiveness in brokering a compromise,
citizen review groups lost stature as a forum for hosting
productive dialogue about siting issues. Sponsoring non-
profit institutions squandered an initial endowment of good
will from residents: the Library will never get a chance to
regain that trust in Cambridge; the Aquarium will have to
work hard to recover it, according to some Charlestown
residents. Citizens in Charlestown and Cambridge supporting
the facilities lost an opportunity to receive benefits from
development. Furthermore, existing friction between
supporters and local opponents was further exacerbated.
Even opponents pleased that the sponsors retreated from
their original plans now perceive that their worst
expectations of the non-profit institutions and citizen
review procedures were confirmed; during future
negotiations, they will stiffen their resolve to be more
distrustful.
Because of the costs they incurred in these cases,
participants are more likely in future disputes to choose
risk-aversive options which they believe will enable them to
win even if those options don't use resources in the most
efficient way. From my interviews with participants, I
observed that the outcomes of these two cases established a
precedent which reinforced their expectations that future
siting disputes would most likely be played out in a spirit
of confrontation and threat, rather than through a fair and
efficient process.
I chose to examine these two cases for several reasons.
Generally, I wanted to explore the relationship of
entrepeneurial non-profit institutions and their public
during the process of siting new facilities. Specifically, I
wanted to clarify how changes in citizen participation
processes affect the outcome of siting cases involving non-
profits and local communities.
Institutions like the Library and Aquarium are mandated to
serve the public. Because of diminishing government support,
however, these institutions are increasingly expected to act
more entrepeneurially. As a result of these new pressures,
the relationship between non-profit institutions and the
general public is undergoing important changes. First, as I
will point out in my description of the Aquarium case,
promoters of non-profits in siting cases are more likely
than ever before to argue for public support for developing
such facilities on the grounds that they are important
engines for economic growth in their home region. Sponsors
suggest that a new Aquarium in the Navy Yard could draw two
million visitors to Boston every year, resulting in
significant revenue from tourism. Furthermore, facilities
like the Kennedy Library and New England Aquarium are lauded
by promoters as amenities which "can be an important tool
for maintaining and increasing private investment. Places
that are attractive to people will have the competitive edge
for job-creating investment. " 2
Can we assume that a non-profit institution engaged in doing
good works finds it easier than a typical developer to
negotiate a solution to siting problems with local
residents? These cases show that the problems of siting
facilities are similar across many categories. The process
2 Robert H. McNulty, The Economics of Amenity: Community
Futures and the Quality of Life (Washington D. C.: Partners for
Livable Places, 1985), p. 16.
is difficult whether the facility is considered an amenity
or noxious; and whether the sponsor is non-profit or for-
profit.
Yet, I suggest in this thesis that there are special
dilemmas for non-profit institutions cast in the role of
developers siting facilities, even those considered
amenities. When attempting to site a new facility, non-
profits must sometimes pursue goals which bring into relief
the incompatibility between developing real estate and
traditional relationships with their public.
This thesis also examines if non-profits, accumstomed to
serving the public, are more adept in negotiating a solution
to a siting dispute with local residents. Will adjusting
the input of local communities through a formalized review
process make the siting process easier for non-profits?
Because these two cases are similar in all major respects
except for the formalization of the review process, one
might expect that this factor would contribute to a
different outcome. However, the outcomes of the two cases
resemble each other. Therefore, despite the changes in the
review process, there are other factors which, in
combination, have a greater impact on the outcome of the
cases. I will point out how inherent organizational
qualities of non-profit institutions constrain their
capacity to transform themselves into developers and
override restructured relationships with the community. As
one interviewee said about the Aquarium proposal, non-profit
organizations attempting to site new facilities are neither
"a down and dirty development nor a noble institution whom
everybody loves." This ambiguity about siting facilities can
aggravate an already sensitive process. The Kennedy Library
and Aquarium cases are an opportunity to observe, within a
very focused context, such dilemmas facing non-profit
entrepreneurs inventing new relationships with their public.
THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS THESIS
Chapter Two presents the basic facts of the two cases. In
Chapter Three I compare the cases, showing that they are
strikingly similar with one exception: the means for
involving citizen participation in the review process.
Chapter Four examines and compares those review processes to
determine if they significantly affected what happened in
each case. Chapter Five uses both formal theory from the
literature about facility siting and insights from
participants to highlight those other factors which were
important in propelling the cases toward their similar
outcomes. In the last chapter I present suggestions for
non-profit institutions and communities to consider when
grappling with the problems of siting new facilities in
residential neighborhoods.
METHODOLOGY
I used several sources of information to investigate the
history of the two cases and the background context. My
primary source was a wide net of face-to-face and telephone
interviews. I was able to develop a better understanding of
complex issues, events and interactions by asking
interviewees a group of standard questions. I encouraged
interviewees to interpret what they felt were important
dynamics of the case and to analyze the citizen review
process. Many of the people I talked to still have strong
feelings about what occurred and carry with them a committed
sense of what they believe was "right" or "wrong" regarding
the outcome of both controversies. This was particularly
striking for the Library case which was played out more than
fifteen years ago. There is still no consensus among
participants about "what went wrong."
I also consulted professional planners, politicians, and
scholars not directly involved in the specific siting
controversies to explore broader questions. I attended seven
Neighborhood Council meetings and workshops focusing on the
master plan for the Navy Yard and Aquarium at Dry Dock
#5/Parcel 5 to observe Charlestown residents, institutional
representatives, and the Council members at work.
I have relied on magazine and newspaper articles to document
the media's interpretation of events. I used technical
reports and master plans to understand what information was
available to residents and planners at various points in the
siting process.
Finally, there is a vast body of theoretical literature
about the economics of amenity, the process of siting
facilities, multi-party and multi-issue negotiation,
interest group politics, policy implementation, non-profits
and development, feminism, and organizational decision-
making which I tapped to establish a conceptual framework
for my analysis. The literature about urban renewal, the
EIS, and social movements of the 60s provided important
historical background.
I have several other comments about these interviews. The
Kennedy Library case in Cambridge was concluded fifteen
years ago: many interviewees could not recall exact dates
and specific events. On the other hand, controversy about
the Aquarium is still so current that some of the
participants, especially from the BRA and Aquarium, felt
constrained about what they could divulge in interviews.
Last, certain participants did not make themselves available
for interviews, most notably, decision-makers like Stephen
Coyle, Director of the BRA, and John Prescott, Director of
the New England Aquarium and trustees of that institution.
Clearly, their refusal to be interviewed did not permit me
to include their perspective, but I believe my analysis and
conclusions are well-supported.
Certain boundaries of my research are worth noting. First,
it focuses on events in a unique urban area: Boston-
Cambridge. Other cities may process such cases quite
differently. Also, I gave much more attention to the
controversial debate concerning Dry Dock #2 than recent
discussion about Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5.
CHAPTER TWO
In this Chapter I recount the histories of the Kennedy
Library and Aquarium siting cases. Both cases involve
complicated negotiations between individuals from many
organizations. Legal and legislative proceedings ran
parallel to closed-door bargaining between myriad small
groups of professional and citizen participants.
Significant interactions took place during informal phone
conversations, chatting during pauses at meetings, at
community petition drives and demonstrations and both cases
received substantial media attention. Yet, it is not
possible to reconstruct perfectly the course of events and
their relationships. The narratives offered here represent
my effort to weave together the many different perspectives
presented by proponents and opponents of both projects.
I have found it useful to go far back in time to recount
prior development issues and describe citizen-participation
in both Cambridge and Charlestown. I pay special attention
to the activities of the Harvard Square Development Task
Force and the Charlestown Neighborhood Council because they
had roughly similar roles in their respective cases in
HISTORY
providing a locus for citizen input. Understanding them is
key to understanding the impact that different citizen
review processes had and their function is more deeply
examined in Chapter Four.
THE KENNEDY LIBRARY IN CAMBRIDGE
President Kennedy initiated plans for a Library early in his
administration. During the many years which passed before
the Kennedy Presidential Library finally occupied its
current home in Dorchester, however, the process of
development became more complex than anyone might have
imagined, in part, because it coincided with a rise in
citizen involvement in development decisions.
EARLY PLANS
On November 10, 1961, the White House announced plans for
the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library - a museum and archives
- in Cambridge. Please refer to Figure 1 to see a map of
Cambridge. It would be the first Presidential Library built
in an urban setting. Kennedy was especially interested in
12.2 acres owned by the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority,
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bordered by Memorial Drive and the Charles River, Boylston
Street and Bennett Street - an area nearly equal in size to
all of Harvard Square. Figure 2 is a map showing the Sectors
of Harvard Square, including the MBTA yards. Earlier,
Harvard University had tried to acquire the site, but the
MBTA had not been interested.
When President Kennedy visited potential sites in Cambridge
and Boston in October 1963, the media reported that he had
selected a 2 acre site next to the Harvard Business School
across the Charles River from Harvard Square. The Library
would contain an office Kennedy could use after his term
expired as well as a small public museum. This initial
concept was based on the intimate Roosevelt Presidential
Library in Hyde Park, New York.
According to John Stewart, current Director of Education at
the Kennedy Library, Harvard University still wanted to
obtain the MBTA site and had its own agenda. "Harvard
University wanted to get rid of the old subway, tracks,
sheds, parking for buses, so it could use this beautiful
piece of real estate, . .. [the scheme was] to use the Kennedy
Library to replace the MBTA."
Planners were already sensitive to obtaining a site with
proper access, size, and proximity to tourist-oriented
services. Hal Goyette, planner at Harvard, also remembers
that "while Kennedy was alive, we executed a confidential
study regarding siting for the Library at 6 sites near
Harvard University. Harvard owned Shady Hill on Francis
street, but it didn't have adequate public transportation,
and presented difficult access by private car. The
Business School land was considered a good site as far as
access goes, but there was no public transportation. The
MBTA yards had all you needed - access, commercial
facilities, large enough, public transportation, near
Memorial Drive." Figure 3 is an aerial photograph of the
MBTA yards. However, Goyette recollects the "word came
back, 'it's public land and we can't designate it. We [the
Kennedys] need to designate now to start fund raising.' The
selected site at the Business School was made always with
the understanding that the car barn yard was the best site
and continued efforts would be made to secure the site for
joint use." Unwittingly, location had already become an
issue.
NEIGHBORHOOD
DISTRICTS
WATERTOWN
CEN1RA
SOUARE
SA80HTON
Figure 1: City of Cambridge.
Note that Neighborhood Ten corresponds to District 10.
RCCC corresponds roughly with District 7. From Monacelli
Associates, Harvard Square Planning and Design Analysis.
HARVARD SQUARE
Figure 2: Harvard Square Sectors.
from Monacelli Associates
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Figure 3: an aerial photo of the MBTA yards in the
Southwest Sector of Harvard Square, proposed site for the
Kennedy Library. from Monacelli Associates.
20
THE KENNEDY LIBRARY CORPORATION IS FORMED
On December 5, 1963, several weeks after his assassination,
articles of incorporation were filed for the President John
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. Robert Kennedy was named
President of the Library Corporation and Edward Kennedy
Vice-President. An international drive was initiated to
raise money from public subscription to fund a Presidential
Library. By mid-January, twenty-five mail sacks of
contributions had already been received. 1
In April, a committee of 18 internationally renowned
architects was formed to advise the Library Corporation.The
committee included Mies Van der Rohe, Alvar Aalto, Hugh
Stubbins, Benjamin Thompson, Pietro Belluschi, Hideo Sasaki,
Louis Kahn, and I.M. Pei, among others. The Kennedy Library
Corporation selected Pei as project architect in December
1964.
EXPANDED CONCEPT FOR THE LIBRARY
From the original modest idea, a vision for a major
1 Boston Traveler, January 16, 1964.
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memorial, museum and academic complex began to develop.
According to Walter Sullivan, Mayor of Cambridge at that
time, Mrs. Kennedy and Pei felt the view of the power plant
across the Charles River was not appropriate for a memorial.
After assessing a Harvard Business School site plan Study,
Pei concluded that "the site was too small for the proposed
memorial program."2 Also, Harvard University, still seeking
an alternative use for the MBTA yards, had determined that
undergraduates would be reluctant to use a Library situated
across the River. As a result, Pei's firm initiated a site
analysis of the MBTA yards and contracted with Barton/Ashman
Associates to study traffic circulation and parking,
problems posed by that site.
According to Ted Musho, the project director of the Library
from Pei's firm, "the spirit of the idea was new and people
desperately wanted to make it new... a genuine desire to
make it alive, a living memorial: lecture halls, movie
theaters, a juncture between the museum and scholarly
activities .. , a community resource." Such components were
2 Draft Environmental Impact Statement: John F. Kennedy
Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts (Washington, D.C.: General
Services Administration, January 1975), p. 1-20.
seen as making it an even more attractive facility for
Cambridge residents. Lengthy negotiations between various
government agencies, the Library Corporation, and Harvard
University developed an ambitious program for a Library
complex that included:
- 5.3 acres for an archive and museum built by the
Library Corporation and administered by the National
Archives and a Library Corporation-built, Harvard-owned
Institute of Politics.
- 2.2 acres for a Harvard-built and operated Kennedy
School of Government.
- 3 acres of related facilities, owned by the Corporation
for commercial tax-paying development.
- Roughly five acres for a park.
- 1.7 acres for roads.
This program was destined to go through a great deal of
change over the next decade. From a total build-out of
225,000 square feet in the year 1964, by 1973 the plan had
been scaled down to 140,000 square feet.
INITIAL DIFFICULTIES OBTAINING THE MBTA YARDS
From 1964 through 1971 the Kennedy Library Corporation was
preoccupied with fundraising, legally obtaining the site,
and relocating the MBTA yards. The State Legislature agreed
to purchase 12.2 acres from the MBTA for $6 million; 10
acres would be donated, and the remainder sold, to the
Library Corporation. The site would be the Commonwealth's
memorial for the President. In August, 1966 the United
States Congress authorized the General Services
Administration (GSA) to accept title to the facilities once
erected and equipped by the Library Corporation. The
National Archives would ultimately acquire and administer
the Library as a gift from the Corporation. The MBTA, GSA,
and Library Corporation reached an agreement regarding the
deed in April 1967. The land was actually deeded to the GSA
and conveyed to the Library Corporation in January 1968.
Over the next several years, the most pressing question for
Library sponsors became the relocation of the MBTA yards.
In the Boston Globe of September 12, 1970 it was reported
that David Powers, curator of the Library, "disclosed last
night that ground for the Library would probably be broken
by May, 29, 1970 in Cambridge." But this optimism was
premature. Efforts to site the yards in Milton, Dorchester,
and South Braintree had been met by fierce challenges from
local opponents. John Stewart, Director of Education at the
Library, says that "people in Dorchester got very upset
[about the plan to relocate the yards there]. 'Cambridge
gets the goodies and they're giving us the shit.' It was
the biggest anti-Kennedy outcry in Boston up to that point,
ever. " Milton residents actually brought suit in Suffolk
Superior Court to block construction of the yards there.
This problem was finally resolved in 1971 when the MBTA
reached an agreement with the Penn Central Railroad to
obtain one of their properties near South Station as a site
for the subway yards. During this period, other important
changes were taking place: citizen activists were assuming a
greater role in the development process in Cambridge, and
very few of the individuals who were involved in the daily
planning for the Library had any sense as to how
controversial those plans would become.
AN OVERVIEW OF CAMBRIDGE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS
Seen from a city-wide perspective, the controversy which
would surround the proposed library was far from a unique
event. Debate about the Library proposal was only one in a
series of Cambridge development controversies. Cambridge
community activists have long demanded a voice and have
intervened in development and siting decisions. Many
activists cut their teeth on earlier controversies, and they
were ready when the Library plans were unveiled.
Connie Wheeler, city council member and community activist
in the Harvard Square area, describes how the level of
citizen involvement in government changed over time.
According to Wheeler, city politics was dominated by a
machine headed by powerful individuals. She says that
activists had prompted important change "in the early
forties, when the Cambridge Civic Association rose up in
response to corruption in the city. We succeeded in
changing the city charter to plan E, with a city manager and
a mayor elected by the council." The goal was to introduce
non-political, professional management and planning into the
administration of city affairs. Along with other reforms of
the forties, neighborhood associations were established to
cooperate with city hall in tackling important problems in
the city.
In the 40s and 50s development pressures in Harvard Square
were not a great concern for residents. Wheeler describes
the area as being a neighborhood place: "You drove to
Harvard Square to do your errands and parked your car... a
penny for 5 minutes. There were many more stores of
everyday living: plumber, shoes, upholsterer, a 5 and 10,
dress shops. It was a crossroads of people from different
places, but you always ran into someone you knew."
However, a period of growth in the 60s brought increased
development to Harvard Square and some residents became
distressed about traffic congestion and real estate
speculation. Wheeler says, "people were talking about
putting things into Harvard Square before the Kennedy
Library but didn't get that far." One proposal involved
building two towers for offices and residences which was
"squashed because people threatened lawsuits. People had
money enough to raise money to make lawsuits," and were
committed to stop development they felt was inappropriate.
There was no Cambridge planning agency to deal with these
issues. Oliver Brooks, a resident who later had a front row
seat to events connected to the Library, describes how
Cambridge was one of a few cities in the United States which
had its entire urban renewal program cancelled because of
the vehement opposition of local residents. "In the early
60s, the city began an urban renewal effort [with federal
money], developed a plan, and brought it before the
neighborhoods. But there was so much flack that the City
Council got scared and could not approve the contract, and
the effort went down the tubes. The feds were sore as hell;
so there was nothing going on [in Cambridge] ."
Despite neighborhood resistance to development, some
political, academic, and business leaders in the city
believed that the coming of the Library to Cambridge could
be a good starting point for planning and redevelopment of
Harvard Square. What was lacking, they felt, was an
organization capable of initiating such a process.
In 1966, Harvard University and MIT formed a non-profit
community development corporation, the Cambridge
Corporation, governed by a board of academic and business
leaders. Oliver Brooks was hired to be director. The
Cambridge Corporation didn't have a carefully defined
mandate, according to Brooks, but aimed at helping the town
and universities cooperate more effectively on issues like
the lack of affordable housing. The Cambridge Corporation
initiated a conversation among representatives from Harvard
University, private real estate and business groups, and the
City of Cambridge to begin a comprehensive urban renewal
process for Harvard Square.
A major concern expressed in these conversations was of
"undisciplined and uncontrolled speculation in Harvard
Square... which will undoubtedly be the pattern of the
future unless there is some instrumentality for esthetics
(sic) discipline."3 An important tactical question was how
to obtain funding for planning and local grant-in-aid
credits which would meet requirements of the Federal urban
renewal program.
Brooks suggested two possible approaches to initiate
planning: 1. a "quiet study carried forward with private
3 Oliver Brooks, memorandum to the Cambridge Corporation:
Harvard Square - Kennedy Library Development Chronology, January
1967, from Brooks' private papers in New Haven.
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financing; or 2. application for a Survey and Planning Grant
from HUD aimed at doing the research needed to under-gird
the activation of a Title I project." 4
Brooks: "We settled on applying for Model Cities money to
set up a program which eventually became the city's
community development department. If it (the renewal
program) became viewed as a Harvard/MIT effort, it would be
unpopular," because residents feared university expansion.
The Model Cities program for initiating renewal projects was
sufficiently detached from the control of the universities,
according to Brooks, and "ultimately had a tremendous amount
of citizen participation. Its program involved a degree of
citizen control of destiny - a huge step upward. However,
the bureaucracy was very untidy and there was a subagenda of
personal aggrandizement."
An additional impetus for change came from grassroots
activists protesting the war in Vietnam and university
development in Cambridge. Brooks relates one anecdote he
believes is characteristic of the times: "In 1968, I had
spoken to the president of Harvard about parcels of land
' Ibid.
they owned which might be acceptable sites for affordable
housing. However, they weren't interested." After the '69
takeover of University Hall (a student protest), the
attitude of Harvard administrators seemed to change. One
concern of protesters was the lack of affordable housing.
Brooks comments, "They said 'institutions are eating up the
town, eroding the inventory of affordable housing. They
(the Universities) have to do something.' I received a quick
call from the Harvard College Board of Overseers at 1:00 one
afternoon asking if I could suggest a plan for affordable
housing for a meeting that evening. I got it together in a
few hours, presented it, and they accepted it. It was built
within 14 months, pretty fast in those days."
Many small activist groups formed to work on specific tasks.
One group, Planning For People, formed in a local Unitarian
Church to seek to mitigate increasing traffic congestion in
Harvard Square. The group set up and maintained a pedestrian
zone in the heart of the Square, Brattle Walk.
Another citizen group was an association formed during the
40s, "Neighborhood Ten," which monitored development in an
upper-middle class district bordering historic Brattle
Street on the west side of Harvard Square. According to
Martha Lawrence, a leader of Neighborhood Ten, the group was
concerned with "stores pushing out from Brattle Street" into
residential blocks and with hospital expansion. It published
a newsletter to keep people informed. "We were
conscientious citizens. " Their stated policy toward the
Library was "a goal of welcoming the Library if it was not
environmentally too impact ful. The group kept focus on
that."
Another group concerned with development in Harvard Square
was the Riverside-Cambridgeport Community Corporation, a CDC
formed in a working class neighborhood. RCCC took a more
radical, aggressive stance against development than did
other groups; one of its actions was to demonstrate against
University expansion at a Harvard commencement exercise.
According to David Clem, a president of RCCC, the
organization started with the efforts of neighborhood
leaders like Saundra Graham, a black woman who later became
a city councillor and state legislator. RCCC consisted of a
coalition of working class residents, tenants, students and
"professionals interested in community empowerment, funded
by the feds, coming out of Vietnam who considered themselves
change agents."
One goal of RCCC was to safeguard the interests of lower-
income homeowners and tenants in a real estate climate
dominated by for-profit developers and the universities.
Clem describes the attitude of residents toward Harvard
University: "Harvard was considered an ogre when it started
moving into the poorest area of Riverside. There was no way
that small property owners and tenants could compete with
Harvard who could pay high prices."
Clem says RCCC members perceived the Library as "another
deal struck by Kennedy and Harvard ... Harvard is [sic] going
to impose this on Harvard Square without any consideration
of impact on neighborhoods."
The RCCC and Neighborhood Ten eventually formed a coalition,
along with Neighborhood Nine and a Harvard faculty group, to
monitor the plans for the Library complex.
In the mid-60s, the press began to report increased public
scrutiny of Library plans. The Harvard Crimson of February
2, 1967 stated that I. M. Pei suggested a "coordinated
program to protect the Library and cushion the impact on
Harvard Square." The article also quotes Connection, a
Harvard graduate school architectural journal: "an endless
chain of tour buses - 30 to 50 and up to 70" will visit the
Library in a single hour during peak periods. On October
26, the Crimson stated that a planning task force was
proposed by a city advisory council to "give Harvard Square
back to the people, not to the automobiles," a proposal
which eventually brought forth the Harvard Square
Development Task Force which was to become the key forum for
citizens to plan overall development in the Square. The
alarm about automobiles became the battle cry of Library
foes in the mid-70s.
A number of the people I interviewed claim that a great
majority of working-class Cantabridgians - outside of RCCC -
supported the Library despite these concerns. Mayor Sullivan
believes that many of the supporters of Irish, Italian, and
other ethnic extraction who felt an affinity for John
Kennedy, were geographically dispersed away from Harvard
Square - in East or North Cambridge - and not as mobilized
to exert political pressure as were the direct abutters
involved in Neighborhood Ten and RCCC. Sullivan believes the
constituency favoring the Library was so involved in making
a living that they didn't have time to participate in an
activist pro-Library effort. Furthermore, he says that
people generally assumed that any disagreements about
Library plans could be worked out by staff from the City,
Harvard University and the Kennedy Library Corporation with
representatives from the neighborhoods. The atmosphere was
still genial in the early 70s.
CHANGING FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS IN THE LATE 60S AND
EARLY 70S REGARDING SITING FACILITIES
But new federal regulations and processes were being created
which would affect development of the Library in Cambridge.
In January, 1970, President Nixon signed into law the
National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), aimed at making
"federal agencies more responsive to environmental
considerations and values, which had been too frequently
neglected in governmental decision-making." 5
Under NEPA, any development proposal by a Federal agency had
' Roger C. Cramton, "Enforcing the National Environmental
Policy Act in Federal Agencies," The Practical Lawyer, Vol. 18,
No. 5, (May 1972): p. 80.
to "develop and use decision-making procedures that
appropriately consider environmental as well as economic and
technical factors."6  The most significant procedural
requirement of NEPA was the requirement in section 102 (2) (C)
that each agency prepare an environmental impact statement
to be made available to other federal, state, and local
agencies as well as the public and which had to "accompany
the proposal through the existing agency review processes. "
From this requirement was "inferred the concept of the draft
impact statement which must be circulated and made public
for comment prior to the final agency decision."8 The
preparation and results of the draft EIS for the Cambridge
Library site were to eventually be the subject of rancorous
debate and the undoing of the Kennedy Library's plan to
locate in Cambridge.
6 Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson,
Facility Siting and Public Opposition (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Company, 1983), p. 47.
7 Roger C. Cramton, "Enforcing the National Environmental
Policy Act in Federal Agencies," op. cit., p. 85.
8 Ibid. p. 85.
CAMBRIDGE SETS UP A CITIZEN ADVISORY GROUP TO ASSIST
PLANNING IN HARVARD SQUARE: THE HARVARD SQUARE DEVELOPMENT
TASK FORCE
On March 21, 1972, the City Manager appointed a sixteen
member citizen group, the Harvard Square Development Task
Force, to consider all phases of planning for the Harvard
Square area. According to a memorandum from Oliver Brooks,
who was later appointed chairperson, an important goal of
the Task Force was "to assist in finding the answers to the
problems created by the location of the Kennedy Library on
the MBTA site and by the expected development pressures that
would begin to emerge."9
Given that the MBTA yards would be vacated, attention could
turn towards planning the growth the Library project was
expected to spur. Brooks says in his interview that "there
was tremendous development pressure on Harvard Square with
no tools to shape a set of helpful parameters for
development.. it [the Task Force] gave us something more
positive rather than a negative position regarding the
9 Oliver Brooks, Chronology: Harvard Square Development Task
Force and its Relationship to Kennedy Library Development, March,
1972 - Present, July 26,1973, from Oliver Brooks' private papers.
Library. Our mandate was to act as a representative of city
interests to interface with Board of Trustees of the Kennedy
Library Corporation. We also embarked on development of a
Harvard Square study - preparation for land use suggestions
and limitations which would be helpful for development of
Harvard Square."
Brooks says, "we [the Task Force] didn't have much of any
authority except advisory. It was citizen comment .... not
an effort to represent all interest groups. The City
Manager put together a group of people with interest in
Harvard Square and could contribute. We would vote in new
members to recommend to the City Manager."
However, underlying the Task Force wasn't really legitimate
in the eyes of diverse interest groups in Cambridge. "It
was predominately white upper-middle class .... really public
service was the agenda, not representation, and that was a
weakness. Politicians viewed it as another Brattle Street
citizen involvement effort ... advocates for that point of
view, " which Brooks implies was more focused on protecting
the interests of specific groups near Harvard Square than
promoting the welfare of all people in Cambridge. The
relationship with the Library Corporation also wasn't firmly
established. Brooks recalls, "the Library Corporation could
have ignored us, and that would have had no legal
consequences - just political." Rather, the Task Force's
natural ally was the city's professional planning staff who
were especially concerned about controlling the negative
impacts of development.
In June, 1972, the Task Force forwarded a seven-page letter
via the City Manager to the Library Corporation outlining
its views on various issues related to the City and the
Library, including specific recommendation for pedestrian
access, widening border streets around the site, preserving
sycamore trees along the Charles River, construction of an
underground parking structure on the site and 1,000 - 1,500
more spaces nearby, and dedication of the related facilities
component of the complex for residences. The Task Force
wanted to establish a formal review process with the Library
Corporation and initiate a discussion of requirements of the
EIS.
Although the Task Force conducted occasional public meetings
for citizen input, this wasn't seen as its primary
responsibility. Brooks says, "at first, nobody calculated
how high profile the issue would become." Brooks remembers
that at this time community and institutional
representatives still assumed that differences about the
Library development could be easily managed through friendly
negotiation.
CONCERN MOUNTS AMONG RESIDENTS ABOUT RELATED DEVELOPMENT IN
HARVARD SQUARE AND THE LIBRARY AS A TOURIST INSTITUTION
The newspaper headlines of the time highlight increasing
community concern about speculation in Harvard Square
related to the Library. A Harvard Crimson article reporting
on the mood in April 1972 was titled, "the John Fitzgerald
Kennedy Center and Harvard Square: At the Crossroads of
Future Shock". Another article in the April 9, 1972 Boston
Globe, "Kennedy Library Neighbors Howl Over Luxury Housing
Plan," discusses rumors that the related facilities site
might be given over to executive office space and luxury
housing. A Harvard Vice President at the time, Hale
Champion, was quoted in the article: "whatever is done is
going to be worked out with the community, and if what's
finally down on paper doesn't satisfy people, then it'll be
done again."
A proposal to build a 19-story Holiday Inn in Harvard Square
inflamed resistance to the Library in the fall of 1972.
Neighborhood Ten and a group called Human Scale mounted a
petition drive to gather 10,000 signatures opposing the
building. The Holiday Inn controversy drew the attention of
the a New York Times article on September 27, which cited
the worry of city planners that "individual developers,
attracted by the expected tourist rush, will each go their
own way without concern for an overall scheme, for traffic
and pedestrian flow, physical problems, and the character of
the historic Harvard Square area."
Some residents worried about negative impacts were raising
complex questions about the proper scale and function of
Presidential Libraries, and according to Oliver Brooks'
notes, "the distinction between museum as a traffic
generator and other programs."" Martha Lawrence, from
Neighborhood Ten says, "I took a trip and saw all the
Presidential libraries. I was probably the world's greatest
expert on Presidential libraries. Nobody knew much about
1 Ibid.
them. We began an earnest effort to educate people about
these libraries." She is adamant to this day that
"presidential libraries were not put on earth to have
museums. They were mandated to be scholarly little places."
This description did not fit the concept that had evolved
for the Kennedy Library.
Proponents of the Library derided Lawrence's point of view.
Dan Fenn calls such criticism of the Kennedy Library plan "a
piece of elitism... 'the fragility of Harvard Square,' ivy
covered buildings and all that crap. They were really
worried about Winnebagos and bermuda shorts."
Richard Neustadt defended the concept of a Presidential
museum for the public in Harvard Square. "Some of us here
(at the Corporation and at Harvard) deeply wanted the
tourists. We wanted students to be surrounded by a flow of
voters pressing their noses to the glass - a great antidote
to Harvard snobbery. But this got no sympathy from the
neighbors."
To explore these issues, the Task Force chaired a public
meeting in November, 1972 at which Pei and other developers
presented details of their particular proposals. Pei
supported an agreement to preserve perimeter land for
circulation and traffic improvements to allay fears of
residents.
However, solutions to traffic density and lack of parking
were not readily at hand. In December, Pei submitted an
analysis to the Task Force showing that underground parking
on the Library site would be prohibitively expensive.
Proposals to jointly construct and operate a parking
structure with the City were also deemed impractical by the
Library Corporation. Planners started looking at surface
parking on the related facilities portion of the site, which
could relieve parking problems but not provide the total
number of spaces needed.
Another. technical issue regarding traffic - estimation of
attendance figures - caused much consternation. Musho says
that "one of the greatest mistakes, in retrospect, was
conversations about projected visitation. They ranged from
200,000 to 1.5 million per year. For reasons difficult to
fix on, 1 million got to be the number. For the life of me
I cannot put my hand on why that number stayed emerged
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(sic) . We knew we would get 1% of projected yearly
visitation on the highest day. And one half will show up
between 11 and 5 p.m. If one million people visit a year,
we'll get 10,000 people at that time with 1, 700 cars - an
unmitigated disaster. That was the hole at the bottom of
the shaft and we were falling into it. We had shuttle
buses, remote parking, an improved subway service, a taxi
cab drop-off... (but) there was no way to solve problems
convincingly ... the symbol overrode the facts."
In 1973, the city administration, the Task Force, and the
Library Corporation were enmeshed in the process of
constructing a meaningful, mutually accountable
relationship. The City Planning and Development Department
submitted a memorandum enumerating issues still pending.
Several weeks later the City Manager and Task Force "jointly
released to newspapers a statement urging the activation of
a formal design review process."" In April 1973, the City
and Library Corporation reached a tentative understanding
about a "subsequent effort to develop a document of
agreement between the City and the Library, which would give
some legal sanction and legal definition to the actual
11 Ibid.
process." 12 Finalizing such an agreement was never
achieved, in part, because of the Library Corporation's
reluctance to sanction authority to the Task Force, which
had slowly solidified in opposition to Library plans.
PEI'S PYRAMID DESIGN REINFORCES FEARS AMONG ACTIVISTS
In May, 1973 a fateful public event occurred, an event which
most of the interviewees note as a pivotal moment in the
story. In consultation with leaders of the Library
Corporation, Pei had been working in his New York office on
the concept of the physical design of the Library. The
design consisted of a crescent in a square, wrapped around a
large open plaza containing a public pavilion -an 85 foot-
high truncated glass pyramid. Figure 4 is a rendering of the
original design accompanied by the headline from the
Christian Science Monitor. The complex also contained two
400 seat movie theaters.
When Pei publicly displayed the model in Cambridge,
community observers were alarmed. The scale and design
seemed grandiose and tourist-oriented. Saundra Graham
12 Ibid.
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4: Pei's original pyramid design for the Library.
from the Christian Science Monitor, March 27, 1974.
strongly objected to the design: "we almost passed out when
we saw the model ... a glass memorabilia with his (Kennedy's)
P.T. boat, with one million people. It was frightening."
Ted Musho recalls, "I had to go to D.C. to work on something
and I phoned back to find out the reaction (from the
public). 'This is not a Library. This is a public
monument. You bastards lied to us.' We were looking at a
precipice. The next five years we worked on alternative
solutions."
Musho believes that fears of opponents were so reinforced by
their negative impression of this design, that Pei's earnest
attempts to respond were discounted. "We later looked at
the Library, only with a simpler glass box as a structure.
The community still wouldn't take it. Dave Powers [Director
of the Library] said, 'you can put that coconut [upon which
Kennedy had written an SOS when he was shipwrecked in World
War II] in a room and people would come to see it' So that
makes it a museum?"
Oliver Brooks, by then chairperson of the Harvard Square
Development Task Force, described in a memorandum the
emerging conviction of some Cambridge residents that the
museum should be separated from the Library, an alternative
to Pei's concept around which residents increasingly
rallied. His notes from May 22 say that a "public meeting
of upwards of 200 is held at the St. Paul's Church
School.... [there is] a rather strong reaction from citizens
.... about the Library development. There seems to be
substantial sentiment which would favor an excision of the
Museum itself ... with the hope that this facility could
somehow be relocated into a less-congested and more
appropriate area." 1
It was the surfacing of an actual design that solidified
adversarial relationships concerning the Library. Many local
residents either supported or were ambivalent about the
concept of the Library in Harvard Square. However, the
specific form and monumental size of Pei's design stimulated
their fears about the Library and pushed those on the fence
into the camp of Library opponents. Brooks remembers that
even the "Task Force, originally seen as an intermediary,
eventually became an advocate against the Library as
proposed. We got into an adversarial relationship with the
13 Ibid.
Library because the majority of Task Force members felt the
museum was a tourist attraction. We increasingly developed
a feeling we weren't being taken seriously."
Private meetings between Library planners, the Task Force
and community groups had been cordial. But by the late
spring, 1973, even the Boston Globe which had always
strongly supported the Library, criticized Library officials
as "evasive" and unwilling to acknowledge "community
reaction."" The editorial urged more candor. A private
meeting with Senator Edward Kennedy and leaders of the
opposition was not successful in mending fences. David Clem
attended the meeting on behalf of RCCC and says that "the
Senator's office played an uncharacteristic role. Senator
Kennedy was extremely put out and condescending, and this
galvanized the opposition."
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT BECOMES A NEW FOCUS OF
CONTENTION
Next the Environmental Impact Statement became a new focal
point of contentious struggle. The Library Corporation had
" Boston Globe, June 11, 1973.
questioned whether an EIS was even required of them,
alienating community activists. Paul Lawrence, a member of
Neighborhood Ten, recalls that "the EIS was a new thing. It
was murky as to who had to do it ... we had to nudge them
[the Library Corporation and General Services Administration
who would own the facility upon completion] into recognizing
it [the EIS] was their obligation." Harvard University, the
other principal developer, agreed to the need for an EIS.
Richard Neustadt says that "Bok [the Harvard President], who
was new, didn't stand firm. He endorsed the need for an
EIS, and [introducing this requirement into the process]
meant considerable delay."
In June, 1973 the Regional Administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency announced his conclusion
that an EIS was a fundamental requirement for the Kennedy
Library development. The General Services Administration
would be responsible for preparing the EIS.
Over the summer and into the early fall of 1973, the GSA
developed a preliminary draft scope of work for the EIS.
After reviewing the scope, in October the Task Force
criticized the draft as in "substantial noncompliance" with
NEPA along several dimensions. In their view the scope was
incomplete and insufficient, prejudicial, ignored the
additional impact of the Museum as a tourist attraction
beyond its impact as an academic facility, and failed to
provide public hearings.15
By December 1973, the GSA rewrote sections of the EIS scope
and incorporated recommendations from the Task Force to
answer local concerns about the EIS's depth of analysis
regarding socio-economic impacts of tourism. These revisions
in the scope include:
- a section regarding impact on low-income populations;
- a section on psychological, physical, and sociological
impact of visitors on those who live in the area;
- a section on the ecology of the Charles River;
- using unbiased wording, for instance, changing
"justification for parking solution" to "parking
considerations;"
- adding a broader range of concerned citizen groups whose
input would be consulted concerning Library plans;
- adding a section about development on the "related
facilities" site which was targeted for eventual commercial
" Harvard Crimson, October 19, 1973.
development;
- omitting mention of the Kennedy Library's relation to
public schools to avoid bias toward the Library;
- adding a section analyzing Library's conformance to
federal, state, and local land use planning."
In February, 1974, the consulting firm of C.E. Maguire, Inc.
was selected by the GSA as a consultant to assist in the
preparation of the EIS. The selection of this firm raised
another firestorm of disagreement. The Cambridge Chronicle
reported that five groups called for an investigation of
this firm because of allegations the firm had changed its
recommendations in an earlier EIS because of political
17pressure. These groups accused Maguire, Inc. of being a
"highway-oriented, politically staffed firm," implying that
the Library Corporation could exert similar political
pressure on the company. Although the firm was retained by
the GSA, the pitch of distrust heightened.
" Harvard Crimson, December 5, 1973.
17 Cambridge Chronicle, February, 1974.
EVEN WITH DESIGN CHANGES FROM PEI, THE POSSIBILITY FOR
NEGOTIATING A MIDDLE GROUND DIMINISHES
Responding to negative community reaction and increasing
costs of construction, Pei reduced the scale of his original
design. On June 7, 1974, a new design was unveiled for the
Library. This more modest five-story brick structure was
about one-third smaller in bulk and about half the height of
the original. The movie theaters were replaced by one 200
seat auditorium. There were nine educational exhibits,
including, "A Day in the Life of a President," and "Death
and Legacy." The related facilities area was designated for
surface parking. Additional parking was planned at a site
near the Massachusetts Turnpike exit in Allston.
Despite its effort to mitigate negative impacts, the smaller
design -failed to blunt opposition. Ada Louise Huxtable,
architectural critic of the New York Times, wrote an article
critical of the whole program: "does this man of history, of
grace, wit and tragic legend, need to be turned into a
tourist attraction and status sideshow?"" Figure 5 is an
illustration of the new design from Huxtable's article in
18 New York Times, June 16, 1974.
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the New York Times. It's clear that the Library Corporation
was trying to honestly mitigate some of the negative impacts
of traffic and design. But by this time, the resistance to
earlier plans had taken on a momentum of its own that would
be difficult to stop.
Two polls were commissioned to take the public pulse, one
sponsored by the Library Corporation and the other by
opponents. Although neither could claim a high level of
scientific accuracy, each indicated ambivalence among
Cambridge citizens regarding the Library. A group of
Cambridge residents organized themselves as the John
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library Committee to support the Library.
Stewart describes the grim determination of Library
Corporation members: "the attitude to 'fight it and we will
win.. we will persevere... we'll convince people it's a safe
project.'"
NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE EIS DRAFT IS IMMEDIATE AND
OUTSPOKEN
After several delays, the EIS draft was released on January
6, 1975. The 600 page study stated that the Library would
have "negligible impact" on parking, air and noise
pollution, and vehicular and pedestrian traffic. A 60 day
period was set aside for comment from interested parties.
The GSA scheduled a public hearing for February 10.
The EIS had been conducted in a volatile situation where
participants in the siting process were not in agreement
about the procedures that one was to follow under this new
legislation. These doubts combined with the draft's
conclusions aroused the wrath of anti-Library residents.
Robert Moncrief, active in Cambridge civic affairs during
this period an a supporter of the Library, vividly remembers
how the draft EIS affected the mood of opponents. "Shortly
after the EIS was published there was a big public meeting
at the Peabody School and I was asked to debate a member of
the Harvard Law School faculty critical of the project. But
it was really in the nature of a lynching. I thought that
the EIS met concerns in a persuasive way.... but I felt I was
the only one in the room who'd actually read it."
The Task Force also greeted the EIS with skepticism. Brooks
was quoted in a Globe article that he would not comment on
the report until it "has been evaluated in a very sensible
and nonbiased way... we want to get full assurances that a
fair study has been done... (but) I don't think any
reasonable man will accept that the library will have no
impact on Harvard Square." '
Events were coming to a swift conclusion in Cambridge.
According to the Harvard Crimson of January 13, Neighborhood
Ten "requested in federal court a postponement of all
proceedings on the draft impact statement until the GSA
grants access to the background information of its
report .... based on the Freedom of Information Act." A
leader of Neighborhood Ten, Paul Lawrence, signals the
determination of opponents in this quote from the article:
"we think the whole spirit of Environmental Protection
Administration procedure is to have the public make the
decision." The request for data in court and his militant
interpretation of the procedure must surely have
19 Boston Globe, January 7, 1975.
57
demonstrated to Library proponents how resolute their
opponents really were.
Shortly after the draft was issued, allegations of tampering
on the part of the Library Corporation reinforced opponents'
suspicions. A local Cambridge firm was subcontracted by
C.E. MacGuire, Inc. to complete a study of socio-economic
impacts and, I have been told by a number of sources,
submitted a draft of 250 pages containing criticisms of the
Library project. However, this portion of the draft was
boiled down to three pages. Newspaper articles reported that
Steve Smith had screened several chapters of the draft EIS
before it was published.
David Clem was also quoted in the Crimson article referring
to the rumor of tampering: "it's such an obvious whitewash
that it boggles the mind." Today, Clem says that "the
Maquire EIS was dubious and it became clear that some
results ... had been pre-screened and edited out to prevent
damage. It (the draft] was sent for review to Smith and
solicited his comments and modified (sic). MacGuire
acknowledged this."
On January 15, the Task Force issued a Comprehensive Policy
Plan for Harvard Square which, according to the Cambridge
Chronicle, supported the "separation of the John F. Kennedy
Library-Museum from the Library archives, the Institute for
Politics, and School of Government... developing Harvard
Square as 'people-oriented' rather than 'tourist-oriented.'"
Broader public opinion turned against the Library
Corporation because of perceived Library machinations and
the "negligible impact"- judgement of the draft. A Boston
Globe editorial of January 21 slammed the draft statement as
"contradictory in its facts and clearly slanted toward a
pre-ordained conclusion ... [the draft] threatens to
discredit the whole process of environmental impact
statements and further delay the construction of any
memorial to the most charismatic President this country has
had in this century."
LEADERS OF THE LIBRARY CORPORATION FACE A CRUCIAL DECISION
The Library Corporation had to decide whether to fight to
keep the whole complex in Cambridge; to keep the archives at
Harvard and move the museum elsewhere; or to keep the
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Library in one piece and move elsewhere.
Musho recalls that during this period "the self-examination
was a real agony. We felt we couldn't live there [in Harvard
Square] because they wouldn't give up. It was an agony
chiseling away at somebody's resistance. We sensed, we
either jump or see it through. It was slow, agonizing,
deliberate." Dan Fenn described his outrage at that time:
"Opponents wanted to split the archives and museum, but it's
not their institution. They're elitist, and this would
destroy the institution."
After this period of deliberation, on February 6, Smith
announced, "the museum will not be built in Cambridge." A
Boston Globe article on February 7 quotes Smith's statement:
"There are people in Cambridge passionately opposed to the
library complex. Why build it when certain people will be
embittered and resentful? I guess idealism isn't possible
anymore... The threat of lawsuits, which could take anywhere
from one to five years in court, is not a happy prospect.
The draft EIS indicates that the project's negative impacts
would be small and manageable.... costs have increased by
over 120 percent and each year's delay means an additional
15 percent in escalation of construction costs. We cannot
afford any more delays." Yet, a split site was still a
"basic alternative," according to Smith.
If the Archives had remained in Cambridge and museum had
moved elsewhere, the Library Corporation could have
maintained a connection to Harvard University. The
University, Task Force, and Neighborhood Ten came out in
support of this plan. Musho mentions "a scheme for D.C., a
museum in the lower level of the Kennedy Center [For the
Arts]. We were very close to doing so. The archives would
stay at Harvard University. It was a hot idea. But at a
board meeting it was put down: 'you're going to build in a
basement?'" But those in the Library Corporation wishing to
keep the institution intact prevailed and the decision was
made to move both Museum and Archives to a site outside of
Cambridge.
Representatives from the Library Corporation and other
interviewees now suggest that a combination of other reasons
also drove the Library Corporation's decision to drop the
MBTA site. First, it had been well over a decade since the
President had died. It was impossible to tell how long it
would take to resolve Neighborhood Ten's lawsuit or what the
outcome would be. Perhaps Steve Smith had interfered with
the EIS process in some way and was reluctant to allow his
actions to be brought into the public eye. So there was a
sense of exhaustion and with no easy relief in sight, given
the determination of opponents like the Lawrences. Possibly
the fact that Lyndon Johnson's Library in Austin was already
built and running irked the Kennedys and influenced them to
seek a faster, easier solution.
In addition to being pushed out of Cambridge, the Library
was being pulled by new opportunities elsewhere in the
state. Stewart says that "when a decision was made to scrap
the site, the Kennedy Library Corporation was flooded with
alternative site proposals from all over Massachusetts. Our
criteria were that it be a beautiful site, approximately 12
acres, near a university, and accessible to one million
people. " Sites were considered at Quincy Market, the
Charlestown Navy Yard, Barnstable, in Falmouth, in Amherst,
and at Columbia Point in Dorchester.
Musho says, "when we gave our first presentation in
Dorchester they were delighted to see us - a real welcome
from the neighborhood. there were virtues we hadn't seen
which were extraordinary - the water's edge." The site at
Columbia Point, Dorchester was on the tip of a peninsula
with a dramatic view of downtown Boston and the harbor.
There was plenty of room for parking. The Archives and
Museum were eventually located at this site near the
University of Massachusetts, Columbia Point, only about five
miles from the former MBTA yards in Cambridge.
In Cambridge, the City Council transferred control of the
Harvard Square Development Task Force from the city manager
to the Mayor's Office on January 12, a political move to
discipline the Task Force which the traditional political
establishment believed had ruined the opportunity to have
the Library in Cambridge. Mayor Sullivan appointed twelve
new members to the Task Force, all proponents of the
Library.. The Task Force continued to work with professional
staff on a plan for Harvard Square and having completed that
work, was disbanded later in 1976.
CARRYING OVER TO THE NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM
In Cambridge, one finds a protracted, complicated struggle
the outcome of which really didn't satisfy most of the
participants in the process, neither proponents or opponents
of the Library. Paul Lawrence, from Neighborhood Ten, still
feels a compromise could have been worked out. Saundra
Graham felt betrayed by erstwhile ally Neighborhood Ten
which supported an alternative site for the Library in
Allston, even though traffi
neighborhood and would hav
negative impacts. Oliver Bro
Square Development Task Forc
controversy that it was never
Harvard University lost an
Kennedy School of Government
Library. proponents realize
c at the site near Graham's
e had produced considerable
oks regrets that the Harvard
e became so caught up in the
able to broker a compromise.
opportunity to associate its
with a Presidential Library.
that although the current
location
facility
possible
in Dorchester offers certain advantages, the
is utilized but a fraction of what would have been
in the Harvard Square location.
Powerful, non-profit institutions trying to site what many
citizens considered an attractive amenity were pushed out of
Cambridge by a small group of opponents. According to
Oliver Brooks, the Task Force was created in a genial,
rational spirit to coordinate residents, city government,
and developers in the review process. However, as debate
intensified and positions hardened, negotiations became a
free-for-all between participants. The Task Force, itself,
became immersed in the schism that engulfed opponents and
proponents of the Library. The years of conflict left many
people embittered.
Twenty years later,. the effort to site the New England
Aquarium in Charlestown has encountered many of the same
controversies which beset the Kennedy Library in Cambridge.
This happened despite the fact that citizen review was a
more public, formalized process in which attention was given
to avoiding the procedural errors of the past. The next
part of Chapter Two examines the important events of the
Aquarium siting process in Charlestown.
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THE NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM AND THE CHARLESTOWN NAVY YARD
In this section I begin with an account of the early history
of urban renewal on Boston's waterfront and in Charlestown.
This section also briefly depicts the establishment of the
Aquarium in Boston's inner harbor. In addition, I describe
the changing functional and physical environment of the
Charlestown Navy Yard. These narratives converge in the
story of the New England Aquarium's efforts to site a new
facility first at Dry Dock #2 and now at Dry Dock #5/Parcel
5 in the Charlestown Navy Yard.
EARLY HISTORY OF THE BOSTON WATERFRONT
Boston's wealth has traditionally been associated with its
waterfront. Merchants always created value in the coves,
peninsulas, and muddy flats around the harbor. Whether it
was fishing or commerce, artisans gathered near industry to
provide necessary implements or machinery. 1  Many of the
most entrepeneurial merchants moved from trade into banking
1 Ronald F. Ferguson and Helen F. Ladd, "Massachusetts:
State Economic Resurgence," in The New Economic Role of American
States, R. Scott Fosler, ed., (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988) p. 21.
and manufacturing, accumulating an endowment of capital that
could be used in yet other commercial ventures.
Activity around the water was also stimulated by public
involvement. The first public pier was constructed in
1631. The Naval Shipyard at Charlestown was founded in 1800
as one of the Federal Government's primary staging areas for
naval repair, construction, and technological innovation.
Many of the artisans and skilled laborers who serviced the
Yard's industries lived in nearby Charlestown. Figure 6 is a
location map of the Navy Yard in Boston harbor.
Activity in the harbor peaked about forty years ago. Then it
began to decline as older water-oriented industries closed
down. The attrition of the Navy Yard after World War II,
when many of its functions were moved to other locations,
and the trauma of federally-mandated busing to integrate
public schools, had such a negative impact on Charlestown
that its population dropped from 31,332 in 1950 to about
13,500 today.
The Federal government, recognizing the decline of older
parts of cities, passed the National Housing Act in 1949
BOSTON RVOVELOPMENT AUTHOITY V.
Figure 6: location map of the Navy Yard.
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making urban renewal funds available to local communities
which, in order to qualify, would have to submit long-term
redevelopment plans. The Federal government would supply
2/3 of the cost of site preparation for cities to acquire
and clear slum lands. With these slums gone, cities could
then provide infrastructure, tax abatements, and whatever
else was needed to lure profitable reinvestment. In
Massachusetts, the state provided 1/6 of the cost; the city
another 1/6th. In 1954, the urban renewal program was
changed to also include rehabilitation.
Despite Federal programs supporting renewal, it was
difficult to mobilize the city's financial and political
capacity to take advantage of urban renewal in the
waterfront. No private or public organization yet had the
resources to take such a risk. In the private sector,
investors were hesitant to get involved because of the
expense and danger: thirteen foot tides caused such massive
decay of piers and hazardous working conditions that
reconstruction was very expensive. Also, explosive growth
of Boston suburbs made other investments much more
attractive.
John Collins was elected Mayor of Boston in 1960, upsetting
a heavily favored candidate. He appointed Ed Logue as
Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) . These
two leaders catalyzed renewal in Boston's waterfront.
According to Collins, "nothing had been built in Boston in
35 years. 65% of the housing stock was substandard and the
downtown was dilapidated. The waterfront literally was
falling into the water and consisted of rotting shacks and
wharves. A small railroad blocked downtown from Atlantic
Avenue. Scollay Square existed where Government Center is
now and consisted of flophouses and cheap show places and
was really dirty.
"Ed Logue and I developed a comprehensive plan to redevelop
the city which rewrote urban renewal for the whole country.
The prevailing law said that you must have total clearance
and phased rebuilding like what happened in the West End in
'57. They built one building, and when 75% of that was
leased they could build another. They tore down a complete
neighborhood, and I decided as mayor I could never allow
that to happen again." His rather benign interpretation of
what happened during renewal isn't really corroborated in
the case of Charlestown, where strong local resistance
forced the BRA to scale down the amount of clearance
originally proposed for that neighborhood.
Collins' administration initiated changes in the renewal
process. "We rewrote the law from total clearance to a new
concept which included rehabilitation, early land
acquisition, spot clearance, and clever use of local
contribution to costs. We had no money and worked it this
way: the only expense for us in government center was
substituting long term construction costs for the city's
share of the cost... also, building schools in Charlestown
and other neighborhoods."
Plans for the inner harbor were, "to open and rebuild the
waterfront and create public access; and to rebuild
government center. I wanted a continuum from the old state
house across a relocated Atlantic Avenue to the water always
preserved for pedestrians." Some of the broad objectives of
that early plan were:
1. to open the city to the sea,
2. to reinforce neighboring districts,
3. to preserve historic buildings,
4. to create a waterfront residential community,
5. to increase visitor traffic to the city, and
6. to strengthen the city's economy through investment and
increased taxes.
These same principles guide the BRA's actions in the
Charlestown Navy Yard, today.
THE NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM IN THE INNER HARBOR
The City of Boston needed an anchor institution in the
waterfront, an attractive destination for the public.
Collins: "you have to realize that nobody was anxious to
build anything. I knew we needed something along the
[proposed] waterfront which was marine related and people
intensive. The trustees of the [New England] Aquarium
approached me [around 1965] wanting to build an Aquarium
which they would build with privately raised money. I felt
this was a good use of public land given appropriate
constraints."
An interviewee formerly associated with the Aquarium related
how the non-profit institution originated as the domain of a
small group of dynamic hobbyists. "The early Aquarium was
in the building where Bonwit Teller used to be, as part of
the Natural History Museum. In the 50s the Aquarium moved
to City Point where it consisted mainly of little fishbowls.
Then in the mid-60s, these five entrepeneurial guys -
stockbrokers, venture capitalists, sportsmen - said, 'we've
got to have a real Aquarium.' They figured out that Central
Wharf was available and struck a deal with the city which
became a model for development everywhere. The Aquarium
opened in 1969 to one million visitors. It was built to
accomodate 600,000. The day it opened the Aquarium was
overcrowded." Given this overwhelming success, the Trustees
immediately began to think of ways to expand Discovery, a
floating exhibit and meeting facility.
Renewal around Boston's inner harbor was very successful.
It is a popular mix of tourist destinations, condominiums,
and offices. One of the original pioneers on the waterfront,
the Aquarium owns Central Wharf, a valuable piece of
property. If the Aquarium is able to obtain a site for a
new facility in the Charlestown Navy Yard, it must sell this
property for funds to capitalize construction.
URBAN RENEWAL IN CHARLESTOWN
The current effort by the Aquarium to relocate in the Navy
Yard fits into a longer, often controversial, history of
urban renewal in Charlestown. By looking more closely at
past attempts to redevelop Charlestown, we can better
understand the debate concerning development in the Yard
over the past few years.
People in Charlestown have always had a strong sense of
"turf," a strong identification with home. This attachment
was powerful thirty years ago when the population consisted
primarily of working-class Irish families. The Town is only
about a mile square and is separated from the city by roads,
water, and industry. In his book about the original urban
renewal effort in the 60s, The Rehabilitation Planning Game,
Langley -Keyes explains that the fundamental motive among
Charlestown residents during urban renewal was "a positive
attachment to the Town itself and its way of life" as an
urban enclave.2 This motive still drives residents in the
Town, today.
2 Langley Carleton Keyes, Jr., The Rehabilitation Planning
Game, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), p. 132.
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Because they have seen Charlestown borders encroached upon
by public housing and highway construction, many residents
are wary about intervention from private developers,
politicians, and government professionals. Outside
expertise is often greeted with skepticism. One interviewee
from Charlestown described the attitude: "if somebody comes
into Charlestown and says 'I'm an expert and I've got a
great plan for you' people raise their eyebrows and say,
'Oh, Yeah?'"
Charlestown residents in the early 60s experienced some of
the same impulses for citizen involvement that affected
Cambridge. In 1960, a grassroots volunteer group of
citizens, Self-Help Organization Charlestown (SHOC), had
formed independently of government. SHOC promoted rubbish
drives, cleaned up vacant lots, pressured City Hall to
provide trucks for hauling away trash, blocked a liquor
license, and sponsored teen canteens and block dances. In
the beginning of the renewal process, the BRA approached
this organization to form a leadership team for discussing
details of redevelopment in Charlestown.
The early relationship between planners and residents was
marked by an era of good feelings. Despite vociferous
debate in public meetings, bargaining between the BRA
representative, Dick Green, and residents went forward.
Later, as Langley Keyes chronicles, the BRA replaced Green
with a more autocratic planner uncomfortable with the
aggressive, political Townie style. Furthermore, certain
interest groups in Charlestown made it know they did not
feel represented by SHOC.
THE ISSUE OF URBAN RENEWAL POLARIZES CHARLESTOWN
To answer these issues, BRA officials decided to promote an
umbrella advisory group, a Federation, a broader cross-
section of interest groups in Charlestown. However, a
faction of business leaders and clergy gained control of the
Federation and cut SHOC out of negotiations with the BRA.
In reaction to these tactics, a group of outspoken opponents
to BRA plans was able to gain control of SHOC. Moreover,
Town residents expressed discontent over the BRA's process
for creating plans and presenting them to the community.
A tense period of political maneuvering and highly dramatic
public meetings followed. Arthur Walsh, a lifelong resident
of Charlestown, remembers a meeting which "became a real
screaming contest. One of the women threw her shoe at the
stage. A gang formed a car parade blowing their horns on
Bunker Hill Street, against urban renewal - 'Remember the
West End.' Cousins turned against cousins."
After a number of these confrontational open meetings, the
Director of the BRA, Ed Logue, changed BRA tactics in the
spring of 1963 in an effort to pick up enough support to
override the show of SHOC support at public hearings.
During the next two years, the BRA opened up a Home
Improvement Center in Charlestown to help residents with
rehabilitation, architecture, and financial requirements.
The BRA also conducted hundreds of small meetings, block by
block.
In the spring of 1965, federal funds were guaranteed from
the Urban Renewal Administration for removing an eyesore,
the elevated train on Main Street; the Federation had
mounted a successful petition drive supporting renewal; and
a new multi-service center, the John F. Kennedy Family
Service Center, was about to open. The time seemed right to
obtain broader community approval for a renewal plan.
On March 14, a public meeting in the National Guard Armory
attracted about 2,800 people. For about an hour the meeting
was orderly. Then, after an emotional speech by a SHOC
leader, the meeting broke into pandemonium. Despite
protests, a hand vote was hurriedly taken to approve or
disapprove renewal plans. Estimates from several newspapers
claim that renewal proponents triumphed at about a three to
one margin.
This conflict between various factions to win the hearts and
minds of Charlestown citizens, and the dramatic public
meeting which resulted, foreshadows events during the
Aquarium's effort to obtain a site at Dry Dock #2 in the
same way that development controversies in Cambridge
foreshadowed events concerning the Library.
OUTCOMES OF EARLY URBAN RENEWAL IN CHARLESTOWN
The results of this five-year bargaining process are
described by Keyes: "The combination of a vocal, often
scathingly articulate, opposition and of a shaky coalition
of proponents, who themselves placed specific demands on the
BRA, produced a plan that made a serious effort to preserve
the fabric of the entire Charlestown community."3
Arthur Walsh recalls an important outcome of renewal. "They
took down the elevated train on Main Street. This
eliminated an incredible amount of noise and dirt, a real
shot in the arm the Town needed to have. The politicians
had promised this in my generation and generations before."
The BRA also made an important concession regarding
redevelopment of land where a prison stood, an institution
which had always cast an oppressive shadow on Charlestown
because it had been for executions. Walsh recalls how "the
lights went dim in Charlestown when they pulled the switch."
The original renewal plan included tearing down the prison
and replacing it with an industrial park. However, after
much lobbying by the BRA and Townies, the Bunker Hill
Community College was constructed there. In 1973, the
College was welcomed as an important resource to the Town's
youth. But all these changes were achieved only after long
3 Ibid. p. 135.
and bitter struggle.
NEW GROUPS EMERGE TO REPRESENT VARIOUS INTERESTS IN
CHARLESTOWN
During the late 60s, residents established new organizations
to monitor and guide development. Middle-class newcomers
were attracted to Charlestown because of its neighborhood
feeling, proximity to downtown Boston, and beautiful,
relatively cheap housing. Some newcomers became community
activists and helped to form the Charlestown Historical
Preservation Society. Kathryn Downing, a leader of the
Society, points out some of the issues the group confronted.
"The shopping center is a product of urban renewal, but it
turns its back on Main Street and looks like a suburban
shopping mall. Buildings of architectural merit were there,
a Baptist church, which got torn down. In 1967 they
[developers] wanted to tear down the Hurd House, Wiley
House, Warren Tavern." The Historical Preservation Society
organized residents "to save buildings, put in benches,
trees, gaslights, tying it together so it makes visual,
historical sense with respect."
Townies have been active in lobbying for affordable housing
and give heavy support to organizations like the Boys Club.
Their interest focuses on building social and cultural
networks which maintain Charlestown as a family-centered
neighborhood.
In any discussion of the course of urban renewal and
development in Charlestown, one must consider the trauma of
forced busing in the mid-70s. The era of resistance to
busing demonstrated the depth to which a number of people in
Charlestown believe in a powerful "group" identity, a
neighborhood cohesion difficult for non-residents to
understand. This identity often becomes most apparent to
outsiders only when residents take action because of a
perceived threat against its way of life by forces
Charlestown can't control.
THE NAVY YARD: A SOURCE OF JOBS FOR CHARLESTOWN
An important focus of development in Charlestown today is
the Navy Yard. In the past, the Navy Yard was a significant
resource to the Charlestown community. At one time many
Charlestown residents worked in or derived income from
business related to the Navy Yard. Arthur Walsh remembers
the bustle around the Navy Yard, when "City Square [an
important commercial and political intersection near the
Yard] was once a mecca for the Navy. Chelsea Street
[bordering the Yard] was geared to sailors and longshoremen
- barrooms, navy stores, cigarette stores, a movie theater
"Hollywood," the night club 'Jacks's,' an afterhours place.
It was a tough street."
Within the Yard, industrial maritime work was an important
source of income but difficult and dangerous. One
interviewee told me, "My father worked in Dry Dock 2. He
choked down there. If you were in long shore and got stuck
in #2 you wondered how to get out."
THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE NAVY YARD
The Yard has always been physically separated from
Charlestown. But in recent decades it has been psychically
separated, as well. Bassim Halabi, a BRA architect,
describes how the Navy Yard is currently "separated by a
wall, and looks upper class, high income. It's intimidating
even though there is public access."
This separation is reinforced at the downtown end of the
Navy Yard by construction of the Central Artery North Area,
a helter-skelter, confusing series of lights and temporary
roads nearly impossible to decipher. Also forming a barrier
between Charlestown and the Navy Yard are stanchions of the
Tobin Memorial Bridge which tower over a no-man's land
underneath littered with garbage, weeds, construction
materials, and rubble. To reach Gate 4 from Charlestown,
one also must cross Chelsea Street, a four lane road down
which automobiles and trucks often barrel at high speed.
Figure 7 includes an aerial photo of the Navy Yard and a
ground level photo of Chelsea Street.
On the other side of Chelsea Street stands the wall Halabi
mentions, a 2,400 foot length of granite surrounding the
Yard. Within the Yard, the narrow 1,350 foot granite Rope
Walk Building, where rope was manufactured for the Navy,
runs parallel to the wall. Clearly, the boundary between
Yard and Town is not a friendly one to either automobiles or
pedestrians and is an obstacle to more intensive
development.
Figure 7: above, an aerial photo of the Navy Yard; below,
a ground-level photo of Chelsea Street, the granite wall,
and the Rope Walk Building across from Gate 4.
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Today, the atmosphere within the Navy Yard is different from
any other in Boston. Entering from Gate 4, it becomes clear
how the Yard turns its back to Charlestown, its face basking
in light reflected from sky and water. The streets, laid
out in a simple grid pattern, are quiet and spacious with
little traffic. Carefully manicured lawns and shrubs frame
restored buildings of polished brick and granite. Because of
rules governing historic preservation, signage is discreet.
One can easily imagine how a popular destination like the
Aquarium, in combination with other attractions, would
radically alter the personality of the Navy Yard, creating a
much busier, festive atmosphere. According to the BRA's
plans, Second Avenue, a pedestrian axis running from Gate 4
to Yard's End, could some day be developed as a retail/
commercial mall similar to Quincy Market, a "festival
marketplace" near Boston's inner harbor. Figure 9 includes a
photo of the Second Avenue view corridor as it is today and
what the BRA imagines it will look like when the Navy Yard
is more developed.
As one walks the streets further out towards Yards End in
the north, human activity becomes less evident and empty,
dilapidated buildings more common. At Dry Dock #5 the
dIF. -,7-
Figure 8: above, a photo of Second Avenue today; below, a
BRA rendering of the view corridor as a pedestrian mall.
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concrete pier crumbles and twisted metal structures rust. A
few workers sit in parked vehicles, eating their lunch and
looking across the water to East Boston.
Finding the water, one comes to a wooden walkway, part of a
pedestrian path, Harborwalk, bordering Boston Harbor. This
walkway winds around the outer edge of the Navy Yard.
Pleasure boats pitch slightly in their moorings. Arriving
back near the starting point at Gate 4, one reaches Shipyard
Park, a gently sloping meadow leading down to the spacious
expanse of flooded Dry Dock #2, the site originally proposed
by the Aquarium and BRA for the new Aquarium. Photos of Dry
Dock #2 are included in Figure 9. Abutting Dry Dock #2 on
the west is the National Park containing Dry Dock #1, one of
the two oldest in the country. At berth in #1 near the Park
Service museum is the U.S.S. Constitution, and the World War
II destroyer Cassin Young. Over a half-million visitors a
year visit the National Park.
The Town Landing, also bordering Dry Dock #2, is a public
dock with slips for short-term boat mooring, tour boats, and
commuter boats. The environment is serene. Surrounded by
park and historical buildings, with the Bunker Hill Monument
Figure 9: above, the view across Dry Dock #2 to the Boston
skyline; middle, the wooden walkway around the Dry Dock;
below, a view of the length of the Dry Dock toward Gate 4.
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nearby, the Boston skyline glistens across the harbor, only
a short water-taxi ride away across the water.
THE NAVY YARD HAS A 200 YEAR-OLD HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL AND
RESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY
This description is a snapshot of the Yard today. If BRA
plans are fulfilled, development will multiply the numbers
of workers, cars, and residents several-fold, a reflection
of the Yard's busy past when it was an important industrial
center.
The Navy Yard's venerable history began on June 17, 1800,
when the United States purchased 65 acres exclusive of tidal
flats as a navy shipbuilding and repair facility. It became
the site of a naval training school which formed the model
for Annapolis. Over the centuries the Navy purchased more
property and constructed a complex marine industrial
infrastructure. The Yard was the birthplace of important
technological innovation and unique facilities like
"1shiphouses" which enabled builders to construct vessels
undercover for protection. Other products of Navy Yard
innovation include the first iron torpedoboat, the Intrepid,
submarines, and other non-military vessels. In addition,
the many historically significant buildings date from the
1820s through the early 20th century, representing a number
of architectural styles, both residential and industrial.
During its World War II peak, almost 50,000 people were
employed in the Navy Yard, many of them women who welded,
cut sheet metal, and made rope. In 1943, forty-six
destroyer escorts were built in the Yard, 44% higher than
the Bureau of Shipbuilding quotas.
WHEN THE NAVY YARD CLOSES IN 1974, THE BRA ASSUMES OWNERSHIP
THROUGH A COMPLEX SERIES OF LEGAL TRANSFERS AND PARTNERSHIPS
After World War II, shipbuilding virtually ceased; the last
ship was turned out in 1956. The Navy Yard then began
specializing in repair and outfitting, converting the first
guided missile destroyer and mounting sonar booms.
According to the BRA "in 1971, production ended at the
Ropewalk, which had been the sole producer of all of the
rope used by the Navy from 1838 to 1955. President Nixon
decommissioned the Navy Yard in 1974, ending employment for
5,200 workers." * One can imagine the devastating effect
closing the Yard had on blue-collar workers who had earned a
living wage working there and in nearby businesses.
Several years passed while various agencies, including the
Boston Landmarks Commission, National Park Service, the
Departments of Defense and Commerce, the General Services
Administration, and the BRA, worked out a comprehensive plan
for achieving designation of the entire site for inclusion
in the National Register of Historic Places. National
Landmark status was achieved in 1977. The City acquired
over a hundred acres of the Yard in 1978 and initiated
redevelopment in one of the most extensive preservation and
reuse efforts in the country.
A novel approach was needed to satisfy the various
preservation and deed restrictions placed on the 105 acres
transferred to the City from the GSA in 1978. One analysis
states that "by dividing the Navy Yard into three distinct
components and responding to the special characteristics of
each area, many potential development conflicts were more
4 Master Plan for the Yard's End, Charlestown Navy Yard,
(Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority, March 1990).
easily resolved. " 5  This division was meant to encourage
development in less historically significant parts of the
Navy Yard and to protect historic structures. However,
recent conflict over the siting of the Aquarium makes it
clear that the assessment of the division's success is
premature. Figure 10 is a map of the Navy Yard Parcels.
The BRA designated three parcels for development. For one
dollar, the Authority obtained from the GSA a thirty acre
Historic Monument District with twenty-two buildings
designated for restoration, "contingent upon preservation of
the buildings and development and maintenance following
strict guidelines."6  The BRA bought the sixteen acre
Recreational Parcel containing Shipyard Park and Dry Dock #2
for one dollar from the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. The
BRA constructed a public park with grassy areas for picnics,
a fountain, a play area, and a boat landing, and a wooden
deck next to the water. The third parcel, fifty-seven acres
of land, piers, and water called the New Development Area
5 Douglas M. Wrenn, Urban Waterfront Development,
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1983), p. 136.
6 Jeffrey B. Brown and Lois Levit Basilio, Redevelopment of
the Charlestown Navy Yard, (Boston: Boston Redevelopment
Authority. 1987).
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Figure 10: a map of the Navy Yard Parcels. In this map,
Shipyard Park includes Dry Dock #2 and a hotel sits on
Parcel 5, next to Dry Dock #5.
was bought by the BRA from the GSA for $1.7 million with the
intention of developing it to earn revenue. The BRA is
repaying a loan for this amount from the Raymond Group, the
designated private developer in the Navy Yard, through long-
term leasing (99 years) of parcels of land, the values of
which are deducted from the loan.
REDEVELOPING THE NAVY YARD
The BRA has collaborated in complex partnerships to
refurbish the Navy Yard environment. $7 million was
obtained from many agencies including the Bureau of Outdoor
Recreation, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the
Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Coastal Facilities
Improvement Program and the City of Boston. A Urban
Development Area Grant financed site improvements for
streets, sidewalks, lighting and landscaping.
Immobiliare New England (later to become part of the Raymond
Group, a development company) was designated by the BRA to
develop the entire New Development Area as well as several
buildings in the Historic Monument Area. Immobiliare also
contributed $500,000 towards below-market-rate condominiums
in a collaboration with the Bricklayers and Laborers Non-
Profit Housing Corporation. Other co-developers include
firms from Charlestown. HUD and the Massachusetts Finance
Housing Agency aided financing for elderly housing with low-
interest loans.
In 1981, the first stage of redevelopment was completed:
conversion of a former machine shop complex to 376
residential units, Constitution Quarters. In a 1983 brochure
the BRA proposed eventually to build a 1,200 unit
residential community as well as commercial offices, retail
shops, marine-related light industrial activities, low,
moderate, and market-rate residential housing, research
laboratories, and tourist attractions.
REDEVELOPMENT IN THE NAVY YARD SINCE THE MID-80S
Development proceeded slowly in the early 1980s, in part
because the BRA was involved with other important projects
in the City, but construction intensified in 1985 and 1986.
The BRA at that time was earning approximately $1,172,000
per year at the Navy Yard in lease payments, a percentage of
operating revenues on commercial projects, and a percentage
of the sales price on condominiums, a considerable portion
of the BRA's total revenue.
Ambitious new projections were announced for the Navy Yard
in 1987, when the BRA began drawing up a new development
plan doubling the original investment figures, doubling the
amount of housing units, encouraging development of new
hotels, a conference center, a bio-medical research center,
more commercial and research space, marina slips, a swimming
pool and 3.3 miles of public walkways.
A report to Mayor Flynn from the BRA says that the Navy
Yard's "7,000 or more residents will make the Navy yard
larger than half of the towns in Massachusetts, and it will
provide more jobs than approximately 70% of the towns in the
state, 5,500 . " Stephen Coyle, Director of the BRA,
described a proposed master plan as a "blueprint for a new
town in town," a framework for discussions with civic groups
and developers.
Ibid.
THE CHARLESTOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL IS ORGANIZED IN 1986
The Charlestown Neighborhood Council was organized
concurrent with this new push for development in the Navy
Yard in the mid to late 80s. Raymond Flynn, elected Mayor
of Boston in 1983, espoused the concept of neighborhood
empowerment and vowed his commitment to capture benefits
from booming development for Boston residents. In 1986,
Flynn's Office of Neighborhood Services helped set up a
Neighborhood Council in Charlestown. Its goal, according to
a statement from the Office, was "to provide the City of
Boston and the Mayor in particular with the views of the
Charlestown community on matters of city policy and other
activities that affect the neighborhood and its residents."8
The statement also says that the Council is designed to
represent "a variety of viewpoints to each issue, " and "may
take up any issue raised by Charlestown citizens relating to
the operation of city government, " including the BRA' s
activities. "It cannot force any city agency to do as it
says," but can recommend specific actions, press for
8 Charlestown Neighborhood Council, (Boston: Mayor's Office
of Neighborhood Services and the Charlestown Neighborhood
Council, 1986).
explanations, and provide information to the community in
open meetings. Some members are elected at large, others by
precinct, and others selected from well-established
Charlestown organizations like the Bunker Hill Community
College and the Charlestown Boys and Girls Clubs.
A member of the Council, Nancy Keyes, remembers that before
the Council existed, "in the old days at public meetings,
there practically used to be fistfights." In her opinion,
the Council has "a lot of clout. It's a political body.
The recommendations made by the Neighborhood Council are
taken seriously. The Council is successful because it does
present a place for people to come before a political body
in town. Charlestown gets lost because we're so small- such
a small population that politicians don't even come here.
The Neighborhood Council lets people in town focus attention
and brings concerns of Charlestown into City Hall - City
Hall pays more attention. People know we exist."
The 1988 elections indicate that Council elections are taken
seriously by Charlestown residents. 1,130 Charlestown
residents turned out to elect seven at-large members from
among fourteen candidates. Five incumbents were defeated.
According to a Globe article from September 15, 1988, "the
election was depicted by some as a referendum on the future
course of the community" and evidence of the concern among
residents about development in Charlestown and the Navy
Yard.
The Neighborhood Council was designed to deal with some of
the conflicts involved with development, especially in
publicly owned land like the Navy Yard. The 1978 BRA master
plan was still the primary reference document.
CONFLICT OVER DEVELOPMENT IN THE NAVY YARD STARTS THE
PROCESS OF CREATING A NEW MASTER PLAN
In 1987, plans for developing Building 197, a condominium
development named Flagship Wharf, were met with resistance
from Charlestown preservationists even though the
Neighborhood Council had approved the proposal. Opponents
objected to the lack of traffic plans and the size of the
building adjacent to Dry Dock #2. However, at hearings held
by the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency, a
compromise was reached: Flagship Wharf could be constructed,
but no condominiums were to be built on Pier 5 and a new
master plan had to be created. The struggle over Building
197 was a skirmish before the major battle occurred over the
Aquarium plan at Dry Dock #2.
The Council set up a Planning and Zoning Committee which
began in the late summer of '87 to review another draft
Master Plan for the Navy Yard. Phoebe Blake was a Committee
member who had previously objected to the original proposal
at Building 197. She suggests that some of the conflict
concerning Flagship Wharf carried over to the relationship
between the Committee and BRA. "In the summer of 1987, under
pressure from the state, the BRA said it could consider no
further projects in the Navy Yard until a new master plan
was developed. We met with parallel tasks: to create an
IPOD [Intermediate Planning Overlay District] for
Charlestown and a master plan for the Navy Yard. Our [the
committee's] goal was to cut down the commercial aspects of
what was proposed: original plans seemed inappropriate,
suitable for Toledo, Ohio or Framingham, not water-related,
whatever is selling. We met all fall going over zoning and
in January 1988, got serious.
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By May of 1988, there was a lot of pressure to wrap it up.
We didn't know why. Steve Coyle presented a new master plan
at a Council meeting and said 'this is the best thing you
can hope for - it provides jobs, housing.' The Planning and
Zoning Committee gave him total build-out [4.6 million gross
sq. ft.], mix of use, and we also lowered building heights
at the water's edge, created public uses at the water, and
ratcheted up [the amount of] affordable housing so it [the
Navy Yard] would be a part of Charlestown."
Linda Smith who works for the Raymond Group attended the
Planning and Zoning Committee meetings. She characterizes
some of the problems of the Committee differently from
Blake. "We were working on a response to the May master
plan.. .but our process had a poorly defined format. It had
no specific time frame and people wandered in from meeting
to meeting, asking about previously covered points. There
wasn't enough use of our [the Raymond Group's] skills about
development. The final product was too specific, trying to
answer questions which zoning should cover."
Phoebe Blake asserts that the committee process was also
made more difficult because of pressure from other groups in
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Charlestown who were concerned that a window of opportunity
was in danger of closing. "Between May and July there was
intense pressure from labor unions and affordable housing
advocates at Council meetings (who were saying], 'what's
wrong with you people?' In August of 1988, there was a
unanimous vote for the Master Plan from the Council. Usually
this process takes a longer period. At that point, the BRA
said, 'we'll get back to you in 6 weeks.'"
Blake surmises that the BRA was slow in acting on the
Committee's recommendations because they were waiting for
the New England Aquarium to make a decision about building a
new facility in the Navy Yard.
MEANWHILE, THE AQUARIUM AND BRA LOOK AT THE NAVY YARD AS A
POTENTIAL SITE FOR A NEW AQUARIUM
The Aquarium had long sought a new home because of
overcrowding at Central Wharf. Bill Whitney, Director of
Planning for the Aquarium, characterizes problems with the
current site: the structure is "no longer state of the art.
We're turning away people, students. Our education program
has no classrooms. Research wanted to do more on whales and
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needed big tanks. The exhibit paths are too narrow and
essentially we've got a building with its back to the water.
The loading dock is near the snack bar and the facility is
too small for retail."
The Aquarium has been looking for a solution to the
overcrowding problem almost since the day it opened. An
interviewee explains, "the Aquarium had been talking about
potential capital development since '69, looking at the
space extending to Atlantic Avenue. There were a number of
studies to build out from Central Wharf, but the square
footage, given construction costs, was too expensive.
Discovery [the floating exhibition space] was a creative
idea, but they've got to build the Queen Mary II to get
space they would get in the Navy Yard."
Whitney gives more detail about the process of looking for a
new site: "We [the Aquarium] looked at adding to the Central
Wharf building. But Cambridge 7 [the original architects]
said that would cost $35 million. So the trustees said,
'let's move and develop a new facility'. We looked at South
Boston, East Boston, Charlestown and out of town at Rockport
and Providence."
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Victor Karen, a planner with the BRA says, "at this point
[1987 and 1988] the city became concerned that the Aquarium
not move to Gloucester or somewhere outside of the city.
Also, the city wanted to use the Aquarium to leverage other
value and development. The Navy Yard was identified as
potential site... a back of the envelope thing. It was
proposed to the Aquarium that they move to the Navy Yard.
Their Trustees came to look at it [the Navy Yard], and fell
in love with #2. " One imagines that the personal charisma
of Directors Prescott (the Aquarium) and Coyle (the BRA)
played a crucial part in mobilizing energy toward this
proposal - a vision of the world's greatest Aquarium on Dry
Dock #2.
The Aquarium completed a feasibility study of the #2 site
over the summer of 1988. Meanwhile, the Council Planning
and Zoning Committee had been laboring over responses to the
master plan without any notion that a large institution was
considering a major project in the Navy Yard. According to
the BRA, the Aquarium's plans regarding Dry Dock #2 weren't
shared with the Council because the Aquarium was looking at
a number of sites. The Aquarium and BRA believed that any
controversy about a new site would more likely be the result
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of heightened expectations and competition among communities
vying for attention, not from local opposition to the
facility. Instead of notifying communities they were on the
short list and provoking a turmoil over which site was best
qualified to host a new Aquarium, the Aquarium and BRA
decided the most sensible road would be to first allow the
Aquarium to select its preference and then announce that
choice to the public. However, by privately deciding on
Charlestown as the new site and then making a public
announcement of the proposal, the Aquarium and BRA put
themselves into a classic siting dilemma in which they
ultimately had to defend their choice to residents who felt
excluded from the decision-making process.
THE NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM ANNOUNCES ITS INTENTION TO DEVELOP
A NEW FACILITY IN THE NAVY YARD
In September 1988, the Aquarium announced its intention to
move to the Navy Yard' s Dry Dock #2, upon receiving "city
and neighborhood approval." 9  The match seemed eminently
workable: Charlestown would have a community-friendly
development in the Navy Yard; the Aquarium would get a
9 Boston Globe, September 23, 1988.
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location and space on which to build a greatly enlarged
modern facility.
Aquarium plans proposed that Dry Dock #2 be site of a $130
million state-of-the-art facility, the largest in the world.
A 300,000 sq. foot glass domed building would be constructed
over Dry Dock #2 in Shipyard Park, which measured 700 feet
by 114 feet, roughly the equivalent of laying a glass
skyscraper the size of the Hancock Building in Boston's Back
Bay on top of the Dry Dock. Figure 11 includes a photo of
the Park from the Dock and a rendering of the Aquarium.
Visitors would descend through enclosed walkways into huge
tanks and be completely surrounded by the watery home of
pilot whales and dolphins. Figure 12 is an Aquarium
illustration of the interior glass ceiling of the structure.
The BRA, in principle, had agreed to sell #2 to the Aquarium
for one dollar. The funds for construction would come from
private and foundation fundraising, as well as from the sale
of the original Aquarium on Central Wharf.
106
Figure 11: above, a photo of Shipyard Park from the walkway
around Dry Dock #2; below, a plan of the Aquarium as it
would be sited on the Dry Dock.
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EARLY COMMUNITY REACTION TO THE AQUARIUM'S PLANS SEEM
POSITIVE
The project was revealed rather abruptly to members of the
Charlestown Neighborhood Council and other concerned
citizens before it was announced to the media. The Boston
Herald had floated rumors about possible Aquarium activity
in the Navy Yard, but Charlestown residents were unable to
get specific information from the BRA and assumed the
stories referred to a small satellite facility like a
dolphin pool. On the day of the announcement, Council
members who were traditionally supporters of the BRA's
activities in the Navy Yard were invited to a meeting before
the press conference.
But other members of the Council, like Kathryn Downing, were
asked to come to the meeting with only a half-hour notice.
Katherine McDonough, a Council member says, "I found out
about the Aquarium at a BRA press conference. Shortly
thereafter, Prescott made a presentation. They had a last
minute meeting with the Council at the Aquarium prior to the
media presentation." Linda Smith of the Raymond Group says,
"the first I heard about it was when I picked up the paper
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Figure 12: rendering of the interior of the Aquarium.
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that morning."
Charlestown- residents I interviewed say that community
response was generally positive to the Aquarium proposal.
McDonough says, "I thought it was pretty exciting because
the Aquarium is a wonderful institution." David Pacifaro, a
public relations consultant to the Aquarium from Northeast
Management says, "two polls indicated that Charlestown
attitudes were very positive about the Aquarium as a good
fit in the Navy Yard. Everybody was very optimistic at
first."
Some members of the Council supported the proposal because
they believed that the Aquarium development would result in
benefits for Charlestown residents. In the opinion of these
supporters, the non-profit institution was an excellent
choice as developer for #2 because it provided a public
service and would generate even more development in the Navy
Yard. Because Dry Dock #2 could not be developed for
housing or commercial use, developing the Aquarium there
would produce benefits and leave other parts of the Yard
available for affordable housing. Dennis McLaughlin,
Chairperson of the Neighborhood Council says, "My
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perspective is from someone who grew up here. You have a
hole filled with water. There are two issues for me. The
Navy Yard needs a jump-start to generate investment
interest. The Aquarium does that. It's cultural but not a
heavy duty roller-coaster ride. We all know the Aquarium
will revitalize interest. Everyone agrees the need is
there, even amongst opponents. My goal is community
benefits. Someone suggested # 5 [as an alternative site for
the Aquarium]. If the Aquarium is on #2, you can use #5 for
housing. I wanted to save #5 for that. My point of view is
to leverage benefits: the Townie perspective is that the
Navy Yard doesn't mean much except for benefits to Head
Start and other groups." Figure 13 is a reproduction of an
Aquarium handout listing some of the benefits the facility
would bring to Charlestown.
CONCERNS RISE TO THE SURFACE
Despite the initial positive response, the Aquarium project
faced a number of serious constraints. Karen from the BRA
recalls questions about the impact of Aquarium visitors on
the Recreational Parcel part of the Navy Yard: "Shipyard
Park becoming a front doormat of the Aquarium because it was
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Aqaarium
NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM
BENEFITS FOR CHARLESTOWN
NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM/CURRENT JOBS
* Currently employs 250 people/55% Boston Residents
* Participation in Boston "Summer Jobs Program"
PROPOSED NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
* 1360 Construction Jobs
* 150 Permanent Jobs
* 100 Aquarium-related.jobs, i.e., retail
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
* Each day trip visitor to the New England Aquarium spends
approximately $10.00 in local community
* Retail targeted to Charlestown merchants first
* Rated top family attraction in City of Boston
CHARLESTOWN OUTREACH PROGRAMS
* Free admission for adults and senior citizens from fall to spring
each year
* Charitable and non-profit groups can apply for free admission
* Live animal programs and slide shows presented at:
* Schools/Day Care Centers
* Churches
e Nursing Homes/Senior Centers
* Hospitals/Health Centers
* Social Service Agencies
* Aquarium educational services to schools:
* School field trips
* Curriculum packages
e Teacher worksbops
e Teacher Resource Center
* Travelling slide and videotape programs
* Aquarium participation in Charlestown community events such as
Harborpark Day, Bunker Hill Day
Figure 13: an Aquarium leaflet distributed
to Charlestown residents.
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easy to see it with two million people visiting a
year... also, sight lines to the city. People who were
opposed felt it would destroy the historic aspect of the
park." Furthermore, the Aquarium proposal for constructing a
large, technologically complex structure in a tight space
did not clearly address difficult questions about limited
vehicular and pedestrian access and parking. Some residents
were frustrated because they felt they could not get
specific information about the design of the structure, in
particular, its height and volume.
Arthur Walsh was distressed about the project's expense and
effect on Shipyard Park. "At first I though they wanted to
go to #5. Then when I heard about Dry Dock #2 in the local
papers I couldn't believe it. Here they'd just completed a
new wooden walkway with imported wood and antique benches."
In addition, some activists felt that the Council's formal
procedures were being manipulated and that they were left
out of the decision-making process. Phoebe Blake maintains
that specific members of the Planning and Zoning Committee
were perceived as potential opponents of the Aquarium
project and were not invited to the initial public
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announcement in an effort to control reception of the
proposal. This perceived effrontery was one in a series of
broken promises and blunders made by sponsors of the plan,
claim opponents. Blake believes that "Coyle stated that with
the Aquarium, something else would go out, 'off the
plate'f other development proposals would be smaller] ."
However, "in the late fall of 1988, it was clear they would
try to put the Aquarium on top of everything else," which
Blake says sabotaged work done by the Council's Planning and
Zoning Committee.
Antonia Pollock of the Boston Preservation Alliance points
out her organization's concerns about "siting and loss of
open space, the area around the Aquarium used as holding
area for buses and traffic. " Moreover, she believes that
the BRA and Aquarium failed to follow established procedures
for including the Preservation Alliance and other groups in
a forthright discussion of plans on Dry Dock #2. Pollack
notes a particular instance in the spring of 1989 when a BRA
employee "characterized a note I'd written the Park Service
as a letter of support from the Preservation Alliance
regarding #2. I was fit to be tied. It came up at a public
meeting. The Alliance hadn't even reviewed it [the Aquarium
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proposal]." This flap over the BRA employee's tactless -
some say deceitful - actions caught the media's attention
and sparked increased coverage of the storm gathering over
the proposal.
In addition to concerns about traffic, preservation issues,
and process, Kathryn Downing points out the significance of
"people issues. The Aquarium didn't help by talking about
whales instead of people. Here you have a grassroots effort
to improve a place just to get sidewalks. We felt it was
ours.. we had earned it. Where do people go in the summer?
The Bunker Hill projects have awful open space. Those kids
go to Shipyard Park, the fountain. They have no
alternatives. A community is not just a place, it's people.
Talking about displacing kids with marine mammals - it
doesn't play well."
AN OPPOSITION BEGINS TO FORM
Over the fall and winter, certain events galvanized
opponents to resist the Dry Dock #2 proposal, a mirror of
what happened in Cambridge. Kathryn Downing remembers in
Fall 1988, "a meeting [of concerned people] about a proposed
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parking garage in Hayes Square. The Bunker Hill Task Force
[a group representing tenants in the subsidized housing near
Chelsea Street] had worked for years with the Preservation
Society on open space in Hayes Square. But the BRA proposed
to build a parking structure there near the Kent School,
outside Gate 4. This galvanized people. The BRA didn't take
into account the struggle over this before. It was a focal
point in busing. The Kent school was designed to be a
fortress. There was a high consciousness of that area for
children." A spontaneous protest arose from this meeting and
opponents to the Hayes garage presented their objections to
local politicians. Downing says, "we formed a group which we
nicknamed, 'A Broad Coalition'," in reference to the fact
that many of the early opponents of the Dry Dock #2 plan
were Charlestown women concerned about their families and
children.
Community activists felt their issues weren't receiving
serious attention from sponsors of the Aquarium plan.
Phoebe Blake says that in the winter, "we [the nascent
opposition] started thinking of [Dry Dock] #5 [as an
alternative]. By February, 1989 we wrote to the BRA
suggesting serious attention should be paid to #5 and Parcel
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5 [which adjoined each other]. We had a meeting with John
Prescott [Director of the Aquarium] to talk about
it. ..nothing happened. "
THE COUNCIL FORMS FOCUS GROUP WORKSHOPS TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS
The Aquarium presented their design to the Council in
December 1988. David Pacifaro, a consultant to the Aquarium
from the Northeast Management Group, remembers that Council-
led "focus groups began in March [1989] to refine ideas
regarding the nature of design, understanding #2 and its
preservation value, legal implications, physical constraints
-it's a tight fit over water ... how would the building sit
on the property? These questions instantly raised questions
of impact ... #2 abuts a park for kids, there are no existing
parking facilities, hard access."
These questions elicited reactions similar to those in the
Library case. Neither the Aquarium or the BRA were prepared
for the level of sophistication of residents concerning
design and traffic issues. Among other objections, opponents
believed that the massive bulk of the Aquarium' s glass
structure was inappropriate in Shipyard Park. Pacifaro
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explains. "In focus groups people raised interesting and
direct questions regarding design, the footprint of the
building, setbacks, drop off lanes for buses. Very
necessary and valid questions. But the development of the
plan was not as progressed as questions about it. You had
ideas but these were hard operational questions long before
the proposal could answer them."
THE AD HOC COALITION TO SAVE SHIPYARD PARK IS ORGANIZED
In Spring, 1989, opponents of the Dry Dock #2 Aquarium plan
began calling themselves the Ad Hoc Coalition To Save
Shipyard Park. They mounted a petition drive collecting
3,000 signatures from all segments of the Charlestown public
to show widespread concern in the community about BRA and
Aquarium plans. They leafleted door to door several times
and also lobbied the media and politicians. Figure 14 is a
reproduction of a handout from the Ad Hoc Coalition To Save
Shipyard Park which encapsulates arguments they used to
reach other residents. The Coalition had allies on the
Council and became a vocal and informed presence at Council
and focus group sessions.
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A DEED RESTRICTION ON THE TRANSFER OF LAND TO THE CITY CASTS
UNCERTAINTY ON THE LEGALITY OF THE BRA' S PLAN TO SELL DRY
DOCK #2 TO THE AQUARIUM FOR ONE DOLLAR
Underlying the discussion was an important uncertainty
regarding the legality of the proposed transaction between
the BRA and Aquarium, a deed restriction in the original GSA
transfer of the Navy Yard to the BRA. A private
organization -even a non-profit Aquarium - could not receive
the property at no cost. The restriction could be
interpreted to mean that the City could only convey the
property to the Aquarium after the Yard had first reverted
back to the National Park Service and been transferred to
the GSA to see if other federal agencies wanted it. If none
did, the city could buy Dry Dock #2 at fair market value and
then sell it to the Aquarium.
Peter Steele of the National Park Service says, "the land
use issue was directly raised to the BRA. It came up at
Council meetings a number of times. The Park Service wrote
a letter concerning the restriction. The BRA said, 'first,
we want to get a consensus. Then we'll deal with the deed
restriction through technical legislation.' The only way to
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DON'T SELL CHARLESTOWN / SAVE SHIPYARD PARK
For $1 (count it!) the BRA wants to sell a "big bite" of Shipyard Park to the New
England Aquarium Corporation. Nobody questions the value of the Aquarium but
Charlestown loses if it moves to Dry Dock 2. HERE'S WHY:
WATERFRONT PARK LOST FOREVER
The proposed Aquarium would "take the waterfront out of our waterfront park." Over 6
stories high and longer than the Prudential Tower is tall, this 4.2 acre astrodome-like
structure would overwhelm the rest of the park and box in the green space. With 14,000
visitors daily on summer week-ends, what remains of our park will become a
"lunch room" for tourists.
TRAFFIC GRIDLOCK / OVERFLOW PARKING
Aquarium consultants estimate that during peak summer months up to an additional
4,400 cars per day will travel through our streets. They propose to widen Chelsea
Street to seven lanes at City Square to handle this traffic . ( For comparison, the The
Southeast Expressway is six lanes). There is no concrete plan for the 1,800 paid
parking spaces needed during peak days. Even if there were, there is no way to
prevent Aquarium visitors from parking free on our streets.
POLLUTION
MGH studies show that Charlestown residents already suffer from higher rates of respiratory
diseases that any other area of the City. With up to 4,400 more cars daily, plus idling
diesel buses, vans and service vehicles, breathing won't be any easier.
TAXPAYERS' MONEY WASTED
To date, OVER $8,000,000 has been spent on Shipyard Park. OUR MONEY!
Should we let the BRA give our waterfront away for $1 ?
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW
If you think this sounds like it should be against the law, you're right.....it is! The federal
government transferred Shipyard Park to the BRA in 1977 on the condition that it
remain a public park FOREVER. Let's keep this law from being changed!
PLEASE SIGN THE PETITION TO SAVE SHIPYARD PARK/DRY DOCK 2
AND COME TO THE
SPECIAL NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL MEETING
TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 7:00 PM - CHARLESTOWN HIGH SCHOOL
. 240 Medford street
Prepared by the ad hoc coalition to save Shipyard Park
(over)
Figure 14: a handout from the
Ad Hoc Coalition To Save Shipyard Park.
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override this regulation was through legislation introduced
by a Massachusetts Congressman." Congressman Joseph Kennedy
III represented Charlestown in Congress and would most
likely be the one to introduce such legislation.
DEBATE INTENSIFIES AND THE COALITION GAINS STRENGTH
Among the three hundred people attending a May Council
meeting in 1989, many wanted the Aquarium to consider Dry
Dock #5/Parcel 5 as an alternative site. However, the
Aquarium took the position that if #2 wasn't available, the
Aquarium couldn't build in the Navy Yard at all. Much of the
public testimony at this meeting was opposed to the plan for
Dry Dock #2. Kathryn Downing, active in the Ad Hoc
Coalition, describes what happened: "we presented the
petition. Sixty people [from the Coalition] stood up to say
something smart [knowledgeable about the proposal].
Meanwhile, there wasn't a strong, informed Aquarium showing,
mostly a lot of young union apprentices who didn't really
understand the specifics of the issues."
The Coalition was also busy persuading politicians of their
determination to stop the Aquarium at Dry Dock #2. Blake:
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"we had mounted an effective letter-writing campaign to Joe
Kennedy. He was in a bind. In July he met with the Ad Hoc
Coalition. We were hard-line with him and he eventually let
it be known he was unwilling to sign [sponsor] legislation
[overriding the deed restriction]."
During the late spring and early summer, the Aquarium made
concessions to make the proposal more attractive: a
percentage of parking fees would be dedicated to Charlestown
youth sports groups; seminars would be conducted for local
merchants to help them take advantage of the expected influx
of visitors; operation of Shipyard Park would be provided by
the Aquarium; teacher training and special programs would be
offered to adults and children; a scaled-down design was
suggested. Despite these concessions, the Ad Hoc Coalition
did not shift its opposition.
The Council met to vote on the proposal on July 11. The
Coalition was prepared to lose the vote, but realized they
could use the event to mobilize their members and gather
support outside of Charlestown. Downing says, "we knew we
had five votes maximum and would lose there.... we called a
press conference with a release using very good language on
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the steps of Knights of Columbus [Hall where the meeting was
held]. Our prepared statement had sound bites ... all the
papers and t.v. stations were there and we did interviews
with the press." The vote was taking place inside a "packed
hall and we weren't allowed to speak -all in front of the
camera [of local television stations]. Pat Ward [one of the
activists in the Coalition] stormed the stage and got the
focus of cameras, raising hollers and yells. She got kicked
out of the meeting. In terms of visuals and text we had it
all."
At this meeting, Council members supportive of the Aquarium
proposal used the opposition of the Coalition to leverage
even more benefits for Charlestown. Downing says, "we pried
loose a 'community fund', 2% of the sales price [of the
Aquarium at Central Wharf because] the younger guys [on the
Council] disliked being pushed around [by the Aquarium and
BRA] and the older guys liked it [the community fund]. A
Council member proposed: 'we should get more money for it
[the Aquarium building at Dry Dock #2].' The Aquarium was
really unhappy about what happened."
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The Neighborhood Council voted 14 to 5 in favor of the
Aquarium relocation. It was now left to the Board of the
BRA to approve the Aquarium as developer of the site. Also,
a written formal agreement was required between the
Aquarium, the BRA, and Neighborhood Council within 60 days
of designation. Then the proposal had to go through 63
design and environmental impact reviews taking from 18 to 24
months to complete.
THE BRA AND AQUARIUM DROP THE PLANS FOR DRY DOCK #2
AND REEXAMINE DRY DOCK #5 AS A POTENTIAL SITE
However, the BRA and Aquarium feared that local
preservationists, neighborhood activists, and state and
federal agencies with oversight on development of historical
places might file a lawsuit based on the deed restriction of
the original transfer of land if plans for Dry Dock #2
proceeded. The General Counsel from the National Trust for
Historic Preservation sent a letter to the BRA indicating
concern about the situation. Although no lawsuit was
actually threatened, Aquarium sponsors realized that such a
lawsuit had the potential to cause great delay, costs, and
further embitter feelings in Charlestown.
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Meanwhile, several members of the Aquarium board were
invited to Charlestown by residents and given a friendly
tour of the neighborhood so they could better understand
some of the concerns of opponents. Perhaps those Trustees
were swayed by that meeting to reconsider their support of
Dry Dock #2 as the preferred site for a new Aquarium.
In addition, Mayor Raymond Flynn was influenced by the show
of support the Ad Hoc Coalition was attracted in the press.
As a politician whose recent career is based on the idea of
establishing consensus, he wanted to avoid protracted
conflict.
Last, a petition with 3,000 signatures opposing the Aquarium
at Dry Dock #2 was presented to Congressman Kennedy and
undoubtedly had an effect on his attitude about introducing
legislation to override the deed restriction. He also
balked at signing because he believed that Dry Dock
#5/Parcel 5 was a suitable alternative and he wanted a
compromise. Nevertheless, an aide to Kennedy made it clear
to members of the Ad Hoc Coalition that the Congressman
didn't want the Aquarium chased out of Charlestown the same
way the Library was chased out of Cambridge.
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As a result, the BRA postponed its vote on the Dry Dock #2
proposal and the Aquarium began to back away from its
refusal to consider #5/Parcel 5 as an alternative site,
stating that the latter had not "been ruled out despite
earlier statements that it was not a practical alternative." "
The Raymond Group publicly suggested in August, 1989, that
they might deed Parcel 5, adjacent to Dry Dock #5, to the
Aquarium in exchange for the right to develop other property
in the Navy Yard. The Aquarium initiated a new engineering
study at Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5, and Dry Dock #2 disappeared
as a subject of public debate.
SEVERAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES PROPOSE WORKING WITH THE
AQUARIUM TO DEVELOP A NEW FACILITY ON DRY DOCK #5/PARCEL 5
With attention now focused on Dry Dock #5 and Parcel 5,
developers became interested in working out a transaction
with the Aquarium for its current property on Central Wharf.
In October 1989, the Raymond Group joined another
development firm, Cabot Cabot and Forbes, to propose
building a new facility on #5/Parcel 5 in exchange for the
Boston Globe, July 29, 1989.
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Aquarium's present site at Central Wharf. Other developers,
the Beacon Companies and the JMB/Urban Development Company
also hinted that they would submit proposals.
A variety of ideas were floated about what project could be
developed at the old site: suggestions included a luxury
hotel and condominiums, and an office tower. The Boston
Harbor Association, according to a Boston Globe article from
October 29, 1989, was "urging city planners to consider
converting Central Wharf into a marine transportation
terminal. Others say they want to see a park on the wharf."
Former Mayor Collins also wrote an op ed piece for the
Globe, reminding readers of the original Central Wharf
agreement which included the legal obligations of the BRA
and Aquarium to maintain height restrictions and a
public/maritime use at the Central Wharf site.
On November 21, 1989, an article in the Boston Herald
reported that "engineering studies show that the New England
Aquarium can build its 'world class' facility at Dry Dock
#5." An Aquarium foe is quoted as saying they want to see
this plan: "naturally, people are suspicious." In January
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1990, the board of trustees of the Aquarium voted to pursue
Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5 as a site for relocation. Figure 15
includes a photo of Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5 as it appears today
and a rendering of the Aquarium on the site.
Over the winter of 1990, Charlestown residents participated
in a new round of Council focus group presentations and
discussions about a new Navy Yard master plan featuring the
Aquarium at Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5. During these meetings
Aquarium representatives sat discreetly in the background,
in contrast to their conduct during the previous year when
they were conducting many meetings and sponsoring public
relations events. A March vote of the Council was nearly
unanimous in support of a new Navy Yard master plan
including the Aquarium proposal at Dry Dock #5. The Council
also supported new zoning specifications, placing the plan
within a legal framework.
During the focus group and Council meetings before the vote,
residents expressed concerns about discrepancies between the
zoning and the master plan, the lack of parking, traffic
congestion, preservation of historic structures, and the
ambiguity of the linkage program. Peter Steele of the
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Figure 15: above, a photo of Dry Dock #5;
below, a BRA rendering of the Aquarium at that site.
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National Park Service says that the "master plan has
substantial preservation impacts on monument structures and
contains a parking proposal which we don't think meets
needs" projected for visitors to the Navy Yard. "But
they're [BRA] just going ahead like the last time. We told
them they'll have to drastically revise until they're in
conformance with the law."
I observed that the Council endorsed the plan, including the
Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5 proposal as a way of seeking relief
from further conflict, as if to say to developers and the
BRA: "we're tired of this mess; let's go ahead on
development in the Navy Yard. See what you can do with it."
In early May 1990, the BRA board tentatively designated the
Aquarium as developer of Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5 in the Navy
Yard, pending solutions to parking and traffic problems.
Figure 16 is a BRA rendering of the Navy Yard master plan.
However, because of these unresolved issues, opponents have
given only qualified support.
If the plan passes that hurdle, then the zoning department
must approve the zoning plan. This legal document defines
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=Figure 16: BRA rendering of the spring, 1990 master plan
for the Charlestown Navy Yard.
131
what heights, densities and uses are either permissible or
conditional in development. After the zoning is approved,
the Aquarium still has several years of permits and reviews
to undergo before it can break ground.
Whether or not a new Aquarium will eventually be built in
the Navy Yard is far from certain. Although the Council is
no longer the forum for debate, a number of obstacles
remain. The BRA, Aquarium, and Raymond Group must work out a
agreement for deeding Parcel 5 to the Aquarium. Abutters
may still press for changes regarding traffic/parking
proposals during one of the many review processes still
remaining. Preservationist organizations who monitor
development or state and federal agencies with oversight
regarding historic sites may object to changes planned for
some of the buildings in the Navy Yard. Indeed, all
development is currently jeopardized because of the economic
slow-down in the Boston real estate market; it may not be
possible for the Aquarium to earn sufficient revenue from
the sale of Central Wharf to build the new facility. At the
moment, resistance from Charlestown residents is quieter.
The Aquarium can now proceed with its fund-raising drive and
begin detailed architectural plans. The new site offers a
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flexibility that than Dry Dock #2 didn't possess: it
contains more dry land and its configuration is less tight
and constricted. Yet, the prospect of siting the Aquarium
anywhere in the Navy Yard still faces many problems.
EVENTS AND OUTCOMES OF THE TWO CASES ARE STRIKINGLY SIMILAR
In many ways, the Aquarium's experience at Dry Dock #2
resembles what happened to the Library in Cambridge. An
elite non-profit institution proposed to site a facility
that appeared to offer many benefits to the local community.
As in Cambridge, Charlestown residents had a long history of
involvement in development issues; sophisticated opponents
emerged with concerns about impacts on historic
preservation, traffic, and quality of life. The citizen
review group in Charlestown, the Neighborhood Council, was
incapable of brokering a compromise between sponsors and
opponents. Facing the prospect of prolonged resistance and
litigation, the institution withdrew its proposal, similar
to what had happened with the Kennedy Library a generation
earlier.
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Neither facility was able to locate at its preferred site.
The Aquarium, however, has accepted a fall-back option in
the Navy Yard at Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5, although it is far
from certain that the new plan can be realized for reasons
given above. Still, the conflict was time-consuming,
costly, and disappointing for participants in both cases.
Moreover, the demoralization of participants as a result of
such conflict reinforces the likelihood of confrontation and
mutual suspicion in future siting cases.
In Chapter Three, I will compare the circumstances, events,
and players in the two cases to isolate what variables are
different from case to case. A significant way in which the
two cases do differ is that the authority of the Charlestown
Neighborhood Council was formally recognized by all
participants as the arena for gathering community opinion
and making recommendations, whereas the Task Force never
achieved that kind of status. In Chapter Four, I take a
closer look at the two review groups to understand how their
performance affected the course of events in the two cases.
My original premise was that if the difference in citizen
review was truly significant, then the outcomes should be
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different. However, despite the difference in citizen
review, the outcomes are actually similar. Establishing what
other factors common to these two cases outweighed the
differences in participation and influenced events in both
cases is the goal of Chapter Five.
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COMPARING THE TWO CASES
Like first cousins, the Library and Aquarium siting cases
closely resemble one another despite being separated by a
generation. This chapter maps out the similarities of
conflicts, processes, decisions, and events in the two cases
as well as important factors which could have had a
significant impact on the outcome of the two cases. Through
such comparison I will pinpoint divergences between the two
cases and analyze which differences seem to be more
pronounced.
In my analysis, I assume that similar factors will create a
similar effect in both cases, i.e., they cancel each other
out when we attempt to explain the outcomes of the cases.
The important factors are the dissimilar ones. In this
chapter I establish that one of the most important
differences between the two cases is that citizen
participation is much more formalized and integrated into
the Aquarium review process than in the Library case. In
later chapters, I investigate whether this difference has
had a significant effect on the outcome of the two case.
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CHAPTER THREE
MAPPING THE SIMILARITIES
Direct links connect the two cases.
Both Cambridge and Charlestown share specific historical
experiences which relate to the Kennedy family. For
instance, according to popular legend, John Kennedy gained
his first major political support from Townies. The Navy
Yard became a candidate to receive the Museum, in part,
because of that association. Another Kennedy link is
suggested by Richard Neustadt, who told me that the Navy
Yard alternative for the Museum wasn't pursued in the mid-
70s because Edward Kennedy's support of busing made him
persona non grata in Charlestown. Years later, in the
Aquarium case, another Kennedy family member, Congressman
Joseph Kennedy III, became a center of attention when he was
lobbied by both opponents and proponents regarding
legislation to override deed restrictions in the original
Navy Yard transfer between the GSA and BRA. Kennedy balked
at signing the legislation because he understood that Dry
Dock #5/Parcel 5 was a suitable alternative to opponents and
he wanted a compromise, yet he didn't want the Aquarium
chased out of Charlestown as the Library had been chased out
of Cambridge.
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The unfolding of events in the both cases is strikingly
similar.
As Chapter 2 illustrates, an ongoing thread of citizen
activism in the development process is present in both
Charlestown and Cambridge. The cases are similar in that
each development was initially greeted with much good will
by residents, setting them apart from typical siting
controversies. However, in both cases, questions were soon
raised about design, traffic, parking and other impacts.
During this period of dialogue, opposition leaders and their
supporters emerged. Bargaining on issues took place in
conversations before and after public meetings, at small
group meetings, within open forums, and through the press.
In both cases, positions eventually hardened and interaction
became marked by accusations of deceit and selfishness.
In both cases, dramatic confrontations took place: for
example, Ted Kennedy's private meeting with Neighborhood Ten
and RCCC representatives; I. M. Pei's unveiling the glass
pyramid; debate between opponents and proponents of the
Aquarium proposal during the May 1989 Council meeting.
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Very specific events were turning points in each case: for
the Library case, the issuance of the long-awaited draft EIS
and the ensuing reaction; for the Aquarium it was the vote
of the Charlestown Neighborhood Council approving the
Aquarium proposal and the Ad Hoc Coalition's press
conference on the steps of the Knights of Columbus Hall.
Although neither case was decided by court action, the
shadow of potential litigation clearly moved proponents to
alter plans and examine the feasibility of other sites.
Leaders from both the Kennedy Library and New England
Aquarium now say that new locations offered attractive
advantages which weren't initially apparent.
The non-profit institutions which participated in these
cases bear a family resemblance.
The key institutions are large, non-profit institutions
pursuing a set of complex goals. The Kennedy Library
Corporation, Harvard University, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority, and the New England Aquarium are altruistic, yet
elite, organizations, the leaders of which presume that by
serving their own needs they also create an important
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amenity for a constituency well beyond their immediate
institutional or geographic boundaries.
The Kennedy Library Corporation and Harvard University
embraced one another for a number of reasons. Harvard sought
a suitable partner to help replace the MBTA yards. They also
benefited from receiving the Institute of Politics. The
Kennedy Library pursued a relationship with Harvard to
fulfill the late President's wishes and to take advantage of
being associated with a major university. The physical site
by the Charles River was also full of promise because of
convenient access to highways and public transportation.
Likewise, the New England Aquarium and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority appear to be compatible partners.
The Aquarium's history of anchoring a revitalized harbor
holds out the promise of similar results for the Navy Yard
from which the BRA could derive substantial revenue. In
addition to stimulating other development, the Aquarium is
an important amenity to the city as a place for recreation
and education. The historic waterfront setting in the Navy
Yard presented the Aquarium with great opportunity to
construct an expanded, modern facility.
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The professional staff of these four institutions perceive
themselves as among the best in the country, with unique and
important missions to fulfill. One remark characterizing
Aquarium staff - "people at the Aquarium are major creative
consultants in the United States and on the international
scene regarding Aquariums" - would be a generous description
of staff at the other three institutions. Opponents of the
institutions might add that this elite esprit de corp is
also marked by a good share of arrogance.
Such complex transactions include other partnerships with
many other public and private stakeholder institutions.
The Library was involved in sensitive negotiations with the
National Archives, the State Legislature, City of Cambridge,
and MBTA. The New England Aquarium must work with the
National Park Service, the Massachusetts Landmarks
Commission, and the MBTA.
Private companies have direct stake in the outcomes of each
case, either as developers of adjacent property or as direct
partners. Outcry over nearby hotel development set the stage
for further protest regarding the size of the proposed
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Library. In the more recent case, the Raymond Group is
negotiating a complex arrangement to transfer Parcel 5 to
the Aquarium as a site for a new facility. Given this new
opportunity, Aquarium developers were more easily able to
shift their attention away from Dry Dock #2.
Legislative leaders and the court system are involved in
both cases.
In both cases, environmental regulations and reviews derived
from federal and state legislation shaped plans. Local and
national politicians, including Senator Edward Kennedy and
Congressman Joseph Kennedy III, are also players in the two
cases. Potential litigation in the courts hovers in the
background despite the formalization of the citizen review
process.
Diversity of abutting neighborhoods in Charlestown and
Cambridge is another important similarity.
In the Riverside section of Cambridge were many working-
class residents, long-time homeowners and tenants, whose
concerns about gentrification reflect those of Townies in
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Charlestown. There were a number of middle-class newcomers
in Riverside involved as community activists who have
counterparts in Charlestown.
Some abutters were also upper-middle class, white, well-
educated residents, derisively nicknamed "Brattle Street
silk-stocking types" in Cambridge and "toonies" in
Charlestown.
But it is impossible to characterize with exact precision
proponents and opponents of the Library and Aquarium. In
both cases coalitions to resist proposed projects formed
across socio-economic lines. In Cambridge, a coalition
formed among the RCCC, Neighborhood Ten, and Neighborhood
Nine; preservationists and Bunker Hill public housing
tenants joined to form the Ad Hoc Coalition To Save Shipyard
Park. Many of the participants in these coalitions already
had years of experience as neighborhood activists.
Both opponents and proponents of each facility in the two
cases argued their claims on the basis of preserving or
creating amenities which served the local community.
Benefits for young people were foremost in the minds of all
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participants. Opponents of the facilities asserted they were
preventing dangerous traffic conditions, or were defending a
neighborhood park and preserving a family-oriented,
neighborhood environment by diverting mass tourism.
Proponents of the proposals argued that, in addition to
constructing a facility which would be a resource to the
local community, they were also creating an opportunity for
job training, unique educational programs, or affordable
housing.
Both cases drew the attention of a national as well as a
local constituency.
In both cases, the institutions were confronted with trying
to balance the demands of a national constituency with those
from the local community.
To deal with local needs, city government set up advisory
groups to monitor development activity. The Harvard Square
Development Task Force and Charlestown Neighborhood Council
were established to provide citizens with a better
connection to each other, the developers and city planners.
Although both groups shared similar tasks, the concluding
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portion of this Chapter points to major differences between
them.
Many residents were involved directly in these cases.
Opinion polling and petition drives were used by opponents
and proponents. Each case featured open meetings to
distribute information and promote dialogue. Interviewees in
both cases also describe confrontational public meetings
attended by hundreds of residents, representatives of
institutions, and the press.
Both cases involved large pools of potential constituents.
Planners estimated that more than a million people would
visit a Kennedy Library constructed in Cambridge. Over a
million people visit the Aquarium at its current site each
year.
A regional and national audience was particularly involved
in the saga of the Kennedy Library, followed with great
interest by reports in Time, Newsweek, the Washington Post,
the New York Times and in small-town newspapers all over the
United States. Oliver Brooks remembers coming home from a
meeting about the Library and being informed by his wife
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that reporters from all three major television networks had
called to get his comments.
Although the Aquarium case has not attracted that kind of
national notoriety, the case has been covered extensively by
the regional press. Council meetings are videotaped by
cable television so there is an instantaneous documentation
of events not present in the earlier case. Neighborhood Ten
had an effective outreach program and published an
informative newsletter; fifteen years later, Kathryn Downing
used television jargon - "sound bites and visuals" - to
describe the Ad Hoc Coalition's sophisticated press campaign
which captured the attention of thousands of television
viewers.
In these two cases key individuals had a disproportionate
impact on their outcomes.
In talking about the Kennedy Library, Dan Fenn pointed out
the necessity of understanding how "the individuals involved
are also very important determinants. There are crucial
points where persons either say yes or no and the thing gets
shaped because of it. We can often wash individuals out of
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stories - that it's great forces, trends, mass emotions. .
but it's more complex."
Certain public figures were powerful decision-makers who
pursued a goal and mobilized the weight of an established
institution behind their decision. Other actors not in the
public light had central roles as leaders of activist
organizations or on professional staffs. They, too, were
determined to achieve a certain outcome.
In both cases, non-profit institutions were trying to obtain
publicly owned land.
Both cases involved the transfer of public land and the
construction of public buildings, economic transactions
which typically undergo special scrutiny. In both cases,
non-profit institutions were receiving donations of valuable
property and had to deal with competing public uses: the
MBTA yards and Shipyard Park. Participants were aware that
the proposed transaction would inevitably draw such
scrutiny. Kathryn Downing characterized the objection of
some Charlestown residents about the proposal at Dry Dock
#2, "The Aquarium said, 'we're good people. We'll take it
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for a dollar.' When the BRA said they were going to sell #2
for a dollar, it provoked a general outrage." David Pacifaro
says, "there are always complicated legal issues with public
lands -it wasn't shocking we needed a consensus... this
happens all the time with public land." Musho concurs,
"public buildings are lightening rods. It's the nature of
the business."
Non-profit projects such as these are often characterized as
generators for economic growth. Robert McNulty in The
Economics of Amenity, summarizes current thinking that
"urban amenities may be a cause ... of economic vitality and
... contribute significantly to its development strategy."'
By suggesting that the "related facilities" component would
produce considerable tax revenue, sponsors of the original
Kennedy Library plan gained the support from many business
and political leaders in Cambridge. Proponents of the
original Aquarium at Central Wharf and proposed Aquarium at
Dry Dock #2 used this rationale to gain support for their
plans. John Prescott, the Director of the Aquarium, heralds
Robert H. McNulty, The Economics of Amenity: Community
Futures and the Quality of Life (Washington, D.C.: Partners For
Livable Places, 1985), p. 4.
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aquariums as a key factor in revitalizing waterfronts, an
urban boon bringing millions of tourist dollars to local
economies. The BRA's March 1990 master plan document states
that the expansion of the Aquarium will increase "spending
by Aquarium visitors from $6,500,000 to $9,000,000,"2 much
of this going to Charlestown non-profits and businesses
given "priority in the creation of a festival marketplace in
a relocated Building 75",3 in the Navy Yard.
Both cases involved complex real estate transfers and
emerging partnerships engineered over a long time period in
a first-of-a-kind transaction, making the whole arrangement
especially fragile.
Development climates changed dramatically over the years
during which these cases were played out. Rapidly changing
property values and construction costs can be hard to handle
for non-profit institutions dependent on the public for
financial support. To be effective, public fund-raising
usually requires certainty about acquisition of the site and
2 Master Plan for the Yard's End, Charlestown Navy
Yard, (Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority, January
1990), p. 19.
3 Ibid. p. 19.
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about the feasibility of the design. The Library
Corporation gained millions of dollars through a public
fund-raising effort at its peak during the years after the
President died. By 1970, seven years after the President's
death, inflation had eaten away at the initial endowment and
donors had become less interested in the cause. Because of
a real estate market gone flat, the Aquarium currently faces
the disappointing prospect of diminished revenues from the
potential sale of Central Wharf. John Wiegel, Vice President
of the Raymond Group, makes this observation about the
effect of changing market conditions. Several years ago
"Boston was such a hot market that developers were willing
and able to accomodate a public benefits package. Today it's
not such a hot market and there's a downside -much more
equity is demanded from developers, tenants need to be
signed earlier, banks are more restrictive in loans. The
Aquarium won't sell the Central Wharf site now for what it
could have six months ago and won't get what it could now in
six months."
How do local communities perceive the economics of these
cases? Saundra Graham from RCCC said, "Brattle Street felt
the value of their property would decrease [because of the
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increased traffic]. We felt value of our property would
increase [because of speculation]" to the point where the
traditional community couldn't afford to live in Riverside.
Similar concerns motivated opponents to the Aquarium in
Charlestown. Would residents be less contentious during a
siting process if other opportunities for development were
less available?
Each project was promoted as an architectural and
programming tour de force.
Ted Musho, the project manager from I.M. Pei's office,
describes the templates for memorials from which the Library
architects drew their inspiration. "We don't have the model
of a Greek temple to fall back on. The latent image in the
soul of every American is really the Lincoln Memorial. I.M.
is emotionally carried away with that memorial." Pei's
creation was the glass pyramid, the ancestor of the one he
finally built at the Louvre in Paris. "It's an analogy of a
'non-memorial' symbol, the New England lighthouse: an
ideated sentinel, focus, reminder in the storm. It suggests
the Boston Irish coming into the territory guided by a
lighthouse," an image "also profoundly relatable to the
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Chinese and Mr. Pei." By using the "space frame of
Buckminster Fuller - an enclosed space in a web of
structure, .combined with clear glass," the architects
intended to "create a sense of place without presumption ...
it would have been sensational."
The Aquarium at Dry Dock #2 was described as suggesting "the
rhythmic repetition and gestures of detail both grand and
intimate which characterize the Navy Yard buildings, and
'industrial strength' buildings of the period(s) ."'
According to its literature, the Aquarium will be "the most
spectacular and most technologically advanced in the
world. "5
Such elevated, auteur notions about design heightened the
intensity of what was already a charged debate about the
facilities. In fact, neighbors often become wary precisely
because a design is labeled a "tour de force.
4 The New England Aquarium: A Report To Charlestown
Community, (Boston: New England Aquarium, June 1989,) p. 7.
5 Ibid. p. 1.
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In both cases, there was heated controversy on the
relationship of the design to the historical, visual, and
psychological characteristics of the surrounding
environment.
Participants disagreed about whether the design was
historically appropriate. In interviews, Library proponents
scathingly described the presumptions of preservationist
opponents. Chuck Daley, a Vice President of Harvard at the
time, says "Pei showing his beautiful model frightened those
who wanted to keep their world the way it was ... or the way
it never was." Richard Neustadt claims that by "'65,
Harvard Square was already appalling, overcrowded, not
beautiful, the traffic pattern already terrible. It was
already headed toward boutiques for suburbanites. We never
did understand what the other side was preserving."
A Council member and supporter of the Aquarium proposal at
#2, Nancy Keyes comments in a similar way about the Navy
Yard, "is it really so historic? Most people remember it as
a bad place. . and the Navy Yard was never a place for kids
anyway. All they do is run around those vacant buildings."
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However, critics of both developments disagreed with those
ideas, claiming that such facilities would interfere with
the "human scale" or historical continuity of the
neighborhood. Saundra Graham's horror at the "glass
pyramid" Pei proposed for the Library eerily augurs Arthur
Walsh's derision of the first Aquarium plan: "it's like
taking the Hancock building and laying it down on Dry Dock
#2." (Ironically the Hancock building was designed by one
of Pei's partners.)
Both projects were discussed within the framework of master
plans and zoning aimed at controlling growth and tackling
difficult environmental problems. Yet, in both cases,
critics of the projects worried that developers would
attempt to bypass the limits of the plans or that the plan's
limits would not be sufficient.
In Cambridge and Charlestown most residents were delighted
with the prospect of recycling older structures or replacing
inappropriate or ruined ones. But the plans to build the
facility raised serious technical and environmental
problems. Searching for an alternative site for the MBTA
yards delayed the Library for years. The Aquarium proposal
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at #2 required construction of a long, narrow building
crowding a recently refurbished park.
Another major issue at both sites was access and parking.
How to get automobile and bus traffic in and out of the
Library site and Navy Yard was subject to endless debate.
Plans for an underground garage for the Library were
scotched because the soil was judged too soft to support
such a structure. Ad Hoc Coalition members first gathered to
raise an alarum because of a rumor that a garage was planned
for open space outside the Navy Yard.
In both cases, some participants on each side accused their
counterparts of being a "tyrannous minority," behaving with
arrogance and deceit.
In both cases, the actual time expended in conflict in the
siting debate ranged between two to four years.
In all these dimensions, these two cases are strikingly
similar despite their separation by 15 to 20 years. There
are differences between the two cases, but one difference
seems most important. First, I'll enumerate the more
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moderate ones.
MAPPING THE DIFFERENCES
The impact of the death of President Kennedy had a profound
affect on the urgency and concept of the Library project;
the Aquarium case wasn't propelled by such a powerful
factor.
Also, the Aquarium saga hasn't yet become so protracted as
the experience of the Library which dragged on for well over
a decade.
Another difference is that in the Aquarium case, some
residents had already claimed Shipyard Park as a
recreational area for families. They considered the site -
its view of Boston, the Bunker Hill Memorial, and the water
- a special amenity, preserved from development. Other
residents claimed the Navy Yard's value was in what
secondary benefits could be derived from its development.
In the Library case, the community had made no such previous
claim on the site of the MBTA yards: the site was not yet
"owned" by the community.
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In Boston today, the principle of linkage is so well
established that neighborhood residents expect compensation
for negative impacts of development in the form of jobs or a
community fund. This expectation was not present for
Cantabridgians during the Library case but was an important
impetus for residents of Charlestown.
Another difference in the economics of the two cases was
that the real estate market in Harvard Square was already
well-established whereas the Navy Yard is still a beachhead
for potential investment.
Community activists in the Library case worked at saving
several sycamore trees threatened by construction of a small
road nearby. That the Navy Yard is a registered historical
site brings a complexity to the Aquarium case which far
transcends the task of rescuing a few trees by the Charles.
The fate of Building 105 is an example. Navy Yard
technicians invented an important innovation, the chain link
forge in 105. Today, the building contains huge metal
machines. The structure is also filled with asbestos that is
difficult to remove. The original BRA plan was to convert
the headhouse of 105 into an art auction house, demolish the
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remaining portion, and leave the machines remaining as
exhibits in an outdoor sculpture garden. In contrast, the
Preservation Society and National Park Service want to
renovate the building so it can contain a museum focusing on
technological innovation, a small restaurant, and local
businesses. In neither case has a successful solution been
devised for dealing with the asbestos.
Another difference is that local preservationists in
Charlestown and Boston gained the support of the National
Trust for the Preservation of Historic Sites, a well-funded
national lobby group. Opponents of the Library did not have
a connection to that kind of organization.
A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE: A FORMALIZED CITIZEN REVIEW
PROCESS
All of these variations look important to the casual
observer and one might expect them to lead to different
outcomes in the two cases. But one critical difference
stands out from all the others: the manner in which citizens
participated in the decision-making process changed
significantly in the period between the two cases. If one
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were pressed to find similarities in the citizen review
process one would point to the Harvard Square Development
Task Force and the Charlestown Neighborhood Council as
analogous groups for comparison.
But there are important differences between these two. In
Cambridge, the Task Force was appointed by the city manager
to study design, to make recommendations about the Library
and related development in Harvard Square, and to "serve as
the focus for the participation of various organized groups
in Cambridge in the process. "6 However, the Task Force
never really got to take center stage, nor perhaps was it
intended to.
From the inception of the Library in 1963 to the denouement
of the Aquarium case at Dry Dock #2 in 1989, activists and
developers accumulated much experience with development
processes, including procedures for environmental review.
One significant response to past conflicts was the formal
inclusion of citizens during the Aquarium case: a
6 City of Cambridge, "Draft of Memorandum of
Understanding on Project Review Process for Development of
Kennedy Library Site," addressed to the Kennedy Library
Corporation (April 1973), from Oliver Brooks' private
papers.
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representative Neighborhood Council voted recommendations
about development on publicly owned land. Moreover, Boston
Mayor Flynn initiated the neighborhood council structure to
give residents a means of defining what benefits should flow
from linkage, a function very different from the Task
Force's role in the Library case. But what effect did the
formalization of the public input process actually have on
the outcome of the second case? I turn to this question in
the next chapter.
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EXPLAINING OUTCOMES: CITIZEN REVIEW
This Chapter compares the
Force and the Charlestown
whether the differences
affected events and the o
addition, the Chapter
participants as a means
performances were congruent
Harvard Square Development Task
Neighborhood Council and tests
between the two significantly
utcomes of the two cases. In
presents observations from
of exploring if the groups'
with their prescribed missions.
In his interview, David Clem, a leader of RCCC, presents
this insight about the Library case and how similar siting
questions are treated today. "The 70s were the beginning of
change in how large organizations interact with
neighborhoods to do business. If the Kennedy Library
Corporation would repeat the story today they would handle
it differently.
- they'd find out about the concerns of community;
- attempt to answer them;
- and put a proposal out as a result of a process of
soliciting neighborhood input, not as a fait accompli."
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CHAPTER FOUR
However, the outcomes of the two cases were similar.
Negotiation became a time-consuming, costly, and rancorous
conflict involving many people. Decisions derived more from
a fear of litigation rather than a positive compromise
worked out within the community forum. Neither facility was
sited at the preferred location. At its site in Dorchester,
the Library never really achieved its potential as an
educational and cultural center. Cantabridgians never
enjoyed the benefits the Library might have brought to their
community. If the Aquarium is unable to move to the Navy
Yard's Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5, a possible result of the
conflict, residents would forfeit potential benefits
derived from siting the facility nearby. The demoralization
costs in both cases are high for all participants,
diminishing the potential of achieving efficiency in future
siting efforts.
If Clem is right about the current generation of developers
handling such controversies differently, why weren't the
standards he described applied to the process in the
Aquarium case? Perhaps the answer is as simple as one
institution not learning from another's experience. Yet, one
might argue that the Aquarium developers more carefully
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followed Clem's dictum because, on the whole, they behaved
as though the Council was the main stage for public
discussion. Yet, Library proponents said to me that they
were astonished that the Aquarium proponents had learned so
little from what happened to the Library and other similar
controversies. This suggests that the answer is more
complex.
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AD HOC AND FORMAL
REVIEW: THREE CRITERIA
To establish similarities and contrasts between the Task
Force and Council, I sought guidelines which could serve as
a basis for comparison. As a starting point, I selected HUD
guidelines designed by the Federal government in the mid-60s
to insure a greater opportunity for citizens to participate
in urban renewal and Model Cities programs. I compare the
formal mission statements of the groups and how they
actually performed against these criteria.
1. The group is to be chosen democratically and represents
the community. "The citizens advisory committee should
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include a cross-section of all elements in the community."i
How this committee should be appointed or elected is left up
to the municipality.
This guideline brings up a number of questions which
participants in both cases had to face. Who in the community
is best qualified to "advise" developers? Is there a
difference if representatives are popularly elected, self-
selected, or selected by some other authority? What should
their relationship be with non-profit organizations?
Although non-profits may want to serve their host community
in some way, its staff and trustees may not necessarily want
to relinquish control over the siting process to a resident
group.
THE TASK FORCE
One Task Force goal was to channel input from Cambridge
citizens to the city manager and Library Corporation, a
1 Department of Housing and Urban Development, Workable Program
for Community Improvement - Answers on Citizen Participation,
Program Guide No. 7 (Washington D.C.: February 1966), in Citizen
Participation In Urban Development, H. B. C. Spiegel, ed.,
(Washington D.C.: NTL Institute for Applied Behavior, 1968) p.
26.
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difficult function to fulfill considering the Task Force did
not represent a diverse base of Cantabridgians. According
to Chairperson Oliver Brooks, the Harvard Square Development
Task Force was appointed by the Cambridge City Manager from
candidates nominated by the Task Force on the basis of
expertise in politics, architecture and business. Members
had Harvard Square connections through business, residence,
politics, or the University, but did not necessarily reside
in Cambridge. In terms of race and income, the Task Force
did not represent a cross-section of residents in Harvard
Square and adjoining neighborhoods. Rather, the Task Force
consisted of upper-middle class people, serving their
community from a sense of noblesse oblige. In this regard,
they were not unlike the Library board, or Harvard's.
Brooks also said that the Task Force was not formally
connected to traditional Cambridge political leaders. After
the Library decided to move out of Cambridge, these leaders
showed their displeasure with the Task Force by taking
control of the group from the city manager and appointing
new members who supported a pro-development policy. Because
the Task Force was perceived as one interest group among
many, it became isolated from the larger Cambridge
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community.
THE COUNCIL
The Charlestown Neighborhood Council was originally created
by Mayor Flynn's Office for Neighborhood Services and
appointed by the Mayor. Elections were phased in within a
year. One representative is elected from each precinct in
Charlestown. Seven are elected at large. Other members are
representatives from organizations in Charlestown recognized
as stable, ongoing contributors to the community. Council
membership appears to represent a cross-section of the Town,
clearly different from the Task Force: professionals and
blue-collar workers, young and elderly, women and men,
preservationists and businesspeople, newcomers and long-time
residents.
Although members are elected by Charlestown residents, does
such a political process insure that representatives will
objectively serve the interests of all groups in the
community? Or do such elections serve the needs of vested
interests? There are a wide range of answers to these
questions in Charlestown, usually corresponding to
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resident's feelings about the Aquarium.
But first, it might be useful to consider the thinking of
theorist Lawrence Susskind. He is skeptical that such
representative groups can effectively resolve siting
controversies. He suggests that even elected individuals
usually represent interest groups and begin their terms of
duty determined to "use meetings as a platform... and as a
way to generate support, " 2 for their organization, rather
than as an occasion to really create new solutions to
development issues.
Comments from opponents of the Aquarium reinforce Susskind's
notion, claiming that the Council as currently constituted
is actually a platform from which political allies of City
Hall can better pursue mutual interests. Arthur Walsh says
that he "was infuriated at the meetings. Most of the votes
[from members] were from people connected to the City of
Boston, either through their own job or their wife's job.
it was like a rubber stamp."
2 Lawrence Susskind, The Importance of Citizen Participation
and Consensus-Building in the Land Use Planning Process,
(Cambridge: prepared for the Lincoln Land Use Symposium, MIT,
October 1977), p. 30.
167
Dennis McLaughlin, Chairperson of the Council, disputes
Walsh's claim. He explains that the Town is such a tightly
knit place that these cross-cutting allegiances naturally
occur. "How do you disperse it [political power]? It's
tough because Charlestown is so small; a lot of interests
are interconnected. Everybody knows everybody's business in
Charlestown."
Moreover, other Charlestown observers commented to me that
Charlestown's political environment is very competitive, and
representation sometimes takes a back seat to inter-Town
rivalries. Debate between Council members about an issue
like the Aquarium is sometimes shaped by other political or
personal agendas. Langley Keyes' remarks about the struggle
of early urban renewal ring true in 1990: "the impact of the
Townie game of knocking the leader from the top... .and the
Townie characteristics of social equality and love of
political infighting"3 creates a hot political milieu which
makes the planning process much more complicated.
3 Langley Carleton Keyes, Jr., The Rehabilitation Planning
Game (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), p. 101.
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Other critics say that Council representatives are actually
a buffer between politicians and people already active in
well-organized interest groups. Antonia Pollack, of the
Boston Preservation Alliance believes that "there are enough
organizations that have an interest [like] the Charlestown
Preservation Society and unions" and should deal directly
with development issues rather than through an intermediary
group.
David Pacifaro, management consultant to the Aquarium,
disagrees with Pollack, stating that the Council is a good
starting point for forming consensus. "Charlestown's
Council is good news because all the associations in town
had representation. There is a constituency underneath that.
If there are a lot of loosely knitted civic groups, you
might have little coalition building" to form a framework
for making decisions, and the Town would spin its wheels on
development issues.
At one point in the negotiations, members of the Council
suggested that several Charlestown residents serve on the
Board of Trustees of the Aquarium. This idea was rejected by
the Aquarium Board as being premature. Carrying the idea of
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advising on development to actually participating in
governing the institution makes sense for Charlestown
activists, but was rejected by Aquarium officials.
The Council, despite theoretically being more
representative, is a politicized alternative to the non-
representative Task Force, an arena where individuals and
interest groups in the Council jockey for higher position.
The Council serves a useful purpose by becoming a place
where representatives from different interest groups meet
together, face to face, in the same room and it is clear it
is the locus of such communication.
2. The group deliberates issues in an orderly fashion using
pertinent information provided by developers and
professional planners. Information and decisions are shared
with the wider community. "The neighborhood citizen
participation structure must have sufficient information
about any matter to be decided for a sufficient period of
time so that it can initiate proposals and react
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knowledgeably to proposals from others."4 To properly
obtain information and deliberate in an orderly fashion, the
group must be able to "set policy, develop rules and by-
laws.
One of the most sensitive tasks for developers is picking
the correct time for sharing information with the public.
Before financing and feasibility are assured, developers may
want to keep information closely guarded. Sometimes,
information is shared only to satisfy legal requirements.
In other cases, developers may make dramatic public
announcements to create excitement and headlines. It is
typical in siting cases that residents and sponsors of
facilities disagree about the control and meaning of
information, and tensions result. Citizen review groups are
organized to better manage the flow of information. Poorly
timed or worded public announcements can exacerbate that
disagreement. Non-profit institutions have the additional
problem of wanting to announce early and with certainty
4 Department of Housing and Urban Development, Workable
Program for Community Improvement - Answers on Citizen
Participation, Program Guide No. 7 (Washington D.C.: February
1966), in H. B. C. Spiegel, ed., op. cit. p 33.
5 Ibid. p. 31.
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about design and site, so they can begin fundraising for the
facility.
THE TASK FORCE
Oliver Brooks stated that the Task Force was a seat- of-our-
pants operation without by-laws. However, Brooks' records
indicate that the Task Force followed a formal protocol
during meetings featuring debate, votes, and minutes.
Committee reports and Task Force memoranda show a
sophisticated analysis of issues.
Brooks' records make it clear that the Task Force was
constantly seeking a means of formalizing a relationship
with the Library Corporation. However, Brooks believed that
the Task Force was not taken seriously by Library planners,
and information and collaboration with developers flowed
irregularly, at best. On the other hand, the Task Force
consulted closely with the city manager and its work was
promoted by the city as an important part of the review
process.
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Brooks remembers that the Task Force called "public meetings
occasionally which we didn't do a great deal to
publicize.. .no public workshops, more than occasionally, but
they often didn't get much turnout." Library Corporation
officials often directly approached members of Neighborhood
Ten with plans rather than work through the Task Force.
Indeed, there was some overlap of membership of Neighborhood
Ten and the Task Force.
The Task Force never took center stage when bargaining took
place because participants didn't acknowledge it had that
role. Paul Lawrence from Neighborhood Ten, David Clem from
RCCC, and, on the other side, Dan Fenn from the Kennedy
Library agree about the lack of a formal public meeting
place where representatives really sat down to listen to one
another. Fenn says, "There were a lot of meetings, smaller
ones. But I don't remember a meeting where Steve [Smith,
Director of the Library Corporation], I.M. [Pei, the
architect] and I said, 'ok, everybody, come Tuesday night.'
There was no open public meeting where everything was on the
table, where we were much other than combative in our own
thinking. We were listening to them more in the sense of
buying them off - not thinking that they live here and have
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a right to say what they want. "
Lawrence describes the effect of a lack of a neutral public
forum. "I wish I could have known how to go about having a
calm discussion at key points. I never felt I could
initiate conversations. We felt out of touch with the
decision-makers. . They said, 'we can't understand that - we
made presentations.' I literally didn't know who to talk
to." Clem concurs: "there were no formal mechanisms for
public discussion. The idea was that none of the individual
organizations had capacity to hold such a meeting, although
there were lots of meetings between leadership."
Therefore, despite the expertise and good will of individual
Task Force members, the Task Force was not collectively
defined as the center for conducting an orderly public
dialogue employing commonly acknowledged processes for
sharing information and debate.
THE COUNCIL
The Charlestown Neighborhood Council is governed by a set of
by-laws outlining its role, organization, and process.
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Council by-law Article 8 defines the extent of public
access: "all meetings of the Council, Council Committees and
the Annual Convention will be open to the public ... and
advertised to insure the broadest possible participation."
The Neighborhood Council conducts a regularly scheduled
public meeting each month during which Charlestown residents
can introduce community issues they feel aren't getting
significant attention through other channels.
Article I also defines the Council's role to "increase
communication between the neighborhood and city departments
and agencies and to provide structured participation in city
government decisions affecting land use, development,
service delivery .... related to Charlestown."
An important task for the Council has been to create an
environment where citizens could gain access to and discuss
information about development plans. Chairperson Dennis
McLaughlin says that "previously [before the Council],
people would attend a meeting and come loaded for bear and
would yell at an official, yelling at neighbors - we don't
want that yelling from an audience. We want it more formal -
they gave me a gavel. " McLaughlin says a difficult job has
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been "setting ground rules to respect a process -closing
times, respect for everybody's voice" in the charged
environment of Charlestown politics.
David Pacifaro uses an "argument from social necessity" to
describe how the process of Council meetings is important.
By gaining access to information and having an opportunity
to speak at regularly scheduled meetings, residents become
integrated into the processes of planning development as a
practical means of ensuring their success.6 Pacifaro says
that "the Council gives processes an orderly fashion. I
don't have to broker consensus - you have a forum to do it
in." The BRA, New England Aquarium, and private developers
also participated in the forum and consulted with Council
committees.
Between 30 and 150 people attended the meetings I observed.
At special meetings called by the Council, representatives
of the BRA outlined the grand scope of their thinking. In
addition, the Council and the BRA sponsored a series of
6 Harold Goldblatt, "Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal"
(Washington D.C.: Health and Welfare Council of the National
Capital Area, January 1966), in Citizen Participation in Urban
Development, H.B.C. Spiegel, ed., op. cit., p. 31.
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focus groups open to the general public during which
presentations were made by planners about specific issues,
questions were asked, and some debate took place. The
Council also held open meetings where citizens spoke out
about development issues, particularly the Aquarium.
Council meetings were conducted through a parliamentary
procedure, and members deftly used those rules to steer the
debate to their advantage. These meetings were sometimes
very heated, pugnacious events during which residents would
verbally pummel the BRA, other officials, members of the
Council, and each other. Much of the debate was well-
informed. At other meetings open to the public, Council
members debated development proposals and then voted a
recommendation.
Experienced observers could accurately predict how members
would vote on issues. Yet, a number of the meetings I
attended had an air of high drama about them: how members
and residents debated and interacted with each other during
meetings had nearly as much symbolic meaning as results of
the Council vote.
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Who controls information is a crucial concern of community
participants. From listening to discussion at meetings, it
was clear that certain members had greater access to
important information from the Aquarium and BRA than others,
a condition which led to open tension among members. The
logistics of keeping 28 people equally informed is
difficult. However, it's undoubtedly true that developers
are selective about divulging information to particular
members when it lends some advantage. Despite a formalized
process in meetings, therefore, residents and Council
members struggled with each other and the BRA and Aquarium
over control of information.
If the struggle to obtain crucial information is just as
difficult during the Aquarium review as the Library case, a
formalized process will be just as unlikely to lead to
significantly different outcomes as an informal one. The
announcement of the Aquarium's intentions to move to the
Navy Yard is a prime example of many Council members being
informed only at the last moment. Interviewees are divided
as to whether the timing and style of the announcement was
a tactical ploy to divert potential opponents, a sensible
decision, or just a hurried public expression of pure joy,
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as one interviewee characterized how the mood of the BRA and
Aquarium might have been: "oh, mygod, we can do this -
someone's gonna let us have our dream."
When information was accessible, the Council became involved
in considering a broad range of issues, some which were
technically complex. BRA professionals felt the Council
worked best as a listening post to neighborhood concerns.
BRA architect Bassim Halabi explains that in "meetings with
the Council you hear about the deep problems in the
neighborhood - what's wrong, what they think should be
done." Victor Karen concurs with his colleague that the BRA
seriously considers the Council's consultation on "a
benefits package, a sense of what will make this [the
Aquarium] more connected to the community in terms of
recreation, business, affordable housing, and jobs."
Participants had different viewpoints about the capacity of
Council members to deal with technical issues of
development: architectural design, economics, and traffic.
Linda Smith from the Raymond Group says that micro-
management of development decisions taking place in Council
committees hindered effective planning -- better to leave it
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up to professionals. McLaughlin also points out the
limitations the Council has in dealing with data. "We have
accomplished getting dialogue out in public now so we can't
bring things to premature conclusions.... [but] we have to
recognize that we go from plateau to plateau, and
acknowledge our limitations, technical and especially
environmental and legal - the community isn't qualified."
The view that Council members should concentrate on advising
professionals about linkage packages is quite different from
that of other residents and Council members who want to
study and debate implications of technical data. At meetings
I observed, members of the Council and attending residents
made very astute comments on BRA estimations of traffic
density, for example. During the struggle over urban
renewal in the early 60s, Charlestown residents also feared
they weren't getting enough information. Therefore, how
information was generated, interpreted, and distributed
seems to be a recurring source of conflict in development
debates in Charlestown. Formalizing the review process
doesn't completely alleviate tensions which result from
disagreements over who controls information and what
information is relevant.
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3. The citizen group has meaningful authority in determining
the outcome of development issues. "Opportunities should be
afforded area residents to participate actively in planning
and carrying out the demonstration."
THE TASK FORCE
Brooks points out in his interview that the Task Force was
formed to "assist in finding answers to questions .... to be
helpful... to prepare land-use suggestions and limitations
which would be helpful .... citizen comment, yes, but no
sign-off." The Library Corporation and Harvard University
were not answerable to the Task Force in any way. However,
Brooks says, "we quickly became so well informed that the
(City) Manager by-and-large took our recommendations unless
it was politically off-the-wall. Our only leverage was
being appointed by the city manager.
Representatives of the Library Corporation and Harvard
University never formally recognized the Task Force's
Department of Housing and Urban Development Model Cities
Administration, CDA Letter No. 3, (Washington D.C.: , October 30,
1967), in Citizen Participation in Urban Development, H. B. C.
Spiegel, ed., op. cit.. p. 30.
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authority, in part because the Task Force was seen as part
of the opposition's camp. Neighborhood Ten and RCCC
preferred to operate independently. No matter how informed
Task Force members were, the group was never seen as a
neutral body and, consequentially, lost authority.
THE COUNCIL
The Charlestown Neighborhood Council has a clearer official
mandate of authority than the Task Force. A statement from
the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services, the
"Charlestown Neighborhood Council," defines this authority:
"the Council cannot force any city agency to do as it says,
but it can inform the Mayor of Charlestown's feelings on any
subject and recommend that they take specific actions. When
its recommendations are not followed, the Council can and
does press for explanations."
The formal, explicit expression of the Council's authority
is a vote. Yet, it's not clear what voting majority is
necessary to recommend or stop a development proposal from
going forward to the BRA Board hearing. McLaughlin says
about the vote on the original Aquarium plan: "The support
182
for Dry Dock #2 was two to one [actually, 14 to 5] but that
wasn't enough, if the level of opposition is that great ."
What numbers deter the BRA and Aquarium from going forward
with a proposal? Such parameters are only vaguely defined:
whether or not the Council has a veto power hasn't yet been
tested, although it became clear during the Aquarium vote on
#2 that 14 to 5 in favor is considered only borderline
support. Rather, a Council vote on recommendations
indicates to developers and the BRA the depth of support and
resistance - the level of risk - facing a project in
Charlestown. Given the fact that the Aquarium proposal was
approved by the Council yet dropped by the BRA, I conclude
that the Council's approval of a development proposal is
probably less meaningful in getting a project done than
their disapproval is in stopping it.
Beside the explicit authority of its vote, the Council is
endowed with implicit powers. Some residents see the
Council as a means of becoming empowered, an "argument for
democracy ... where citizen participation is considered to
be nothing less than democratic procedure and hence, a self-
justifying end in itself."' McLaughlin says, "it's not a
8 Harold Goldblatt, op. cit., p. 34.
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case of criticizing for the sake of criticizing. It's
learning how to politic, a discipline. This process gets me
into the ballgame. There's a way to address my stuff, too."
A member of the Ad Hoc Coalition, Arthur Walsh, expresses a
similar, yet more minimalist, rationale for the importance
of the Council: "at least you're aware of what's going on -
in meetings and minutes. Before we were just told the BRA
voted to do this or that. Now you can get up and say
something.. there is a record of what goes on."
Some of the Council's strength comes from collaboration
between moderate members and the loyal opposition in
leveraging benefits out of developers. Kathryn Downing
believes that the previous Kevin White administration had
the practice of "giving land to a connected developer;" now
the Council and loyal opposition (i.e., the Ad Hoc
Coalition) can work together to get higher value returned to
Charlestown for development there. That the Aquarium did
make concessions in their proposal over the course of debate
supports her thinking. McLaughlin agrees: "Kathryn and I
form a check and balance. People get something - the
balance does get struck."
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Yet, McLaughlin also cautions that "there is a danger in too
much empowerment. Some faith has to be given to the system.
it gets to be a problem when community debate goes on too
long - it effectively stops development."
Now that the Council mechanism has been invented and
residents have gotten a taste of power, it's difficult for
institutions like the BRA to limit how people use the
opportunity. Robert Seaver wrote in the early 60s: "A
reality is that, once begun, engagement is not something
that can readily be turned off or manipulated to some
predetermined end. Its initiation represents a commitment
on the part of local government and its professional
establishment to let the people have their say and to
respond reasonably to their expressions. Failure to fulfill
the commitment will not end the process, only escalate it
via other channels." 9
Developers and the BRA may see the Council's realm as
advisory and hope to use the Council to more effectively
guide the development process. However, planners cannot
9 Robert C. Seaver, "Pratt Planning Papers, 4" ( New York
City: The Pratt Institute, 1960-65), in Citizen Participation in
Urban Development , H. B. C. Spiegel, ed., op. cit., p. 67.
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dominate a citizen review group if they want it to be
considered legitimate by the community. Antonia Pollack of
the Preservation Society believes that the recommendations
of the Council are "incredibly structured... decisions had
already been made. Its too well orchestrated. They listen
to Coyle [the BRA Director]." Yet, she thinks that "Coyle
has empowered the public [through the review process] and
now he has to live with it," meaning that opponents will use
the Council forum, and other available arenas, to pursue
their goals.
The level of Council authority is continuously being
defined. I suggest this ambiguity serves activists on both
sides of an issue. Because the authority of the Council
recommendation is ambiguous, opponents felt hopeful about
entering the debate. It is precisely because interest groups
sense they can slow the process of development through
Council deliberations that residents have room to maneuver,
organize, and make adjustments - and for proponents to
respond.
The ambiguity of the Council's authority also serves the
developer's and BRA's ends, as well. Peter Steele from the
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National Park Service describes how the ambiguity of Council
authority is a means of achieving a flexible balance of
power between Charlestown residents and the City
administration: "the Council gives the city a way to involve
neighborhoods without losing complete control." Smart
developers can find a way to maneuver fluidly within the
Council's less than air-tight process and ability to resolve
issues.
Planner Victor Karen sees it as a learning process. "It sort
of works. Maybe they and we get better at it. The time
frame will get shorter. They'll learn a vocabulary and
it'll be easier to get things done. The BRA and developers
will learn, also."
DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES IN THE CITIZEN REVIEW PROCESS, THE
OUTCOMES OF THE CASES ARE SIMILAR
The major difference between the two cases, a formalized
citizen participation process, has brought changes.
Formalizing the review process has empowered some residents
who might earlier have been left out of the loop and made
representatives of institutions more accountable to the
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public record. Also, it enables residents to strategize more
effectively to leverage benefits out of development.
However, my original theory was that if the difference in
the formalization of citizen review was a significant
factor, it would lead to different outcomes. However, even
with the benefits from the Council, the outcomes are
similar. Original plans were dropped after long, difficult
debate, in part, because of the potential delays and costs
of litigation. Also, both cases left a residue of
uncertainty and continued distrust among participants. If
the Aquarium case is an indicator, the Council forum has not
been a place where exceptional solutions have been created
to solve development conflicts.
Therefore, there must be other factors that outweigh the
effect that a formalized citizen review process generated,
and cause such cases to have such similar outcomes. In the
next chapter, I will present factors common to each case
which I believe account for the similar outcomes.
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EXPLAINING OUTCOMES: BEYOND CITIZEN REVIEW
Initially, the Aquarium was in a favorable position in
Charlestown. Many residents perceived the proposed facility
as an amenity. The formalized citizen review process seemed
capable of bringing together all stakeholders, including
those concerned about the impacts of the facility. Yet, the
outcome at Dry Dock #2 closely resembles the outcome of the
Library's effort in Cambridge: the non-profit institutions
were unable to site their facility at their preferred
locations, a decision largely prompted by the threat of
litigation. Saying that the similar outcome happened despite
the difference in processes is, of course, not an
explanation of why it happened. In this Chapter I'll draw
out other factors common to the two cases which, taken
together, drove events to a parallel outcome. Some of these
factors are typical to all siting cases; others are
particular to non-profit institutions.
I observed that in both cases participants expressed four
kinds of concerns about the impact of the proposed
facilities. Although presented separately, these concerns
are often connected and compound each other. If they are
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CHAPTER FIVE
present, outcomes will more likely be similar no matter how
citizen input is structured.
1. The design of the physical structure and layout is a
matter of conflict. Critics say, "this building is ugly/the
wrong material" or "there isn't enough open space next to
the building." Proponents claim the building is beautiful.
2. Participants disagree about impact on the local
environment. "These trees/historic buildings will be
destroyed. Traffic congestion will turn the streets into
one big parking lot." Sponsors say that "shuttle buses will
mitigate traffic congestion."
3. There is disagreement over priorities and values. Local
residents claim that "if all these tourists come here, the
play areas for children will be taken over." Non-profit
institutions like the Aquarium and Kennedy Library have a
more broad-based public interest orientation. They say,
"this facility is necessary because it serves a regional
public need."
4. Participants envision themselves as engaged in a David
and Goliath confrontation: "Those big guys think they can
just come into our territory and take what they want;" or,
"That little group of elitist fanatics thinks it can tell
everybody else what to do."
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A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
A complete map of explanations considers all of these
concerns. I want to move to the theories about the outcomes
of the two cases formulated by individuals who actually
participated in them. But let me begin with several
theories about siting controversy which come from literature
in planning and economics. Three theories, in particular,
would predict similar outcomes in these two cases.
1. Lawrence Susskind focuses on the difficult process of
negotiation among multiple parties dealing with multiple
issues. He believes that "the forms of traditional
participatory efforts are, for the most part, inadequate to
the task of bargaining or conflict mediation which is, in
fact, what land use planning ought to be about."' He
disparages traditional efforts to involve citizens in
facility siting as inadequate. Elected or appointed blue-
ribbon panels like the Task Force or Council, he says,
typically present fixed choices that have previously been
1 Lawrence Susskind, The Importance Of Citizen Participation
and Consensus-Building in the Land Use Planning Process
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute Land Use Institute Symposium,
M.I.T., October 1977), p. 31.
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made. He suggests that these groups have little capacity to
create new solutions. Therefore, such outcomes like the
ones we find in the Library and Aquarium cases are to be
expected.
2. Instead of focusing on transforming the process of
bargaining, Richard Andrews looks at the deep strata beneath
the concerns I have outlined. Without resolution of conflict
over these concerns, participants in the debate fear they
will lose economic and psychological control of their
environments. "We must recognize the real issues underlying
the apparent ones.. .There may be much more deep-set
questions of autonomy, of culture, of peer approval of
positions. ,2 He would claim that the outcomes of the cases
are similar because participants don't pay enough attention
to these buried concerns.
3. O'Hare, Bacow, and Sanderson suggest that siting
conflicts occur because of inherent positions separating
developers and community residents. Sponsors of projects
expect their property development rights to be upheld if
2 David Laws, "Case Studies and Questions" (October 27,
1983), in unpublished notes from discussions at The National
Workshop on Facility Siting, p. 3.
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technical procedures demonstrate that the development would
not be detrimental to the public as a whole. "In addition,
they expect development of facilities to be beneficial to
the local community, and expect the community to perceive
this, "3 even more for non-profit institutions developing
amenities. However, many communities are distrustful of
developers because they've been misled in the past.
Residents believe that "property development rights take a
back seat to the community's right to 'control its own
destiny.'"4 Such differing perceptions lead to a direct
clash of expectations among community and developers. The
siting process itself is adversarial and most efforts for
reform through increased public participation has "done
little more than increase public access to courts."'
By superimposing these formal theories onto events in the
two cases we can begin to better understand what occurs in
facility siting cases. It is also useful to sort through the
3 Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson,
Facility Siting and Public Opposition (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Company, 1983), p. 24.
Ibid. p. 25.
Ibid. p. 44.
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observations of individuals who actually participated in the
cases to uncover other factors, some of which highlight
dilemmas facing non-profit institutions in such cases.
EIGHT ROBUST 'FOLK THEORIES' EXPLAIN THE SIMILAR OUTCOMES
Many interviewees presented informal "folk theories" to
explain events in these two cases. What was striking to me
is that interviewees in the two cases developed the same
list independently. This robustness indicates that we should
consider whether they are significant factors in explaining
why the cases had such similar outcomes. These theories all
deal with the interplay between the internal predispositions
of participating institutions and external constraints
affecting the actions of participants. I will also comment
on how these theories apply to non-profit institutions, in
particular.
1. INDIVIDUALS ARE DECISION-MAKERS AND SET EXPECTATIONS
The outcome is the result of one or two powerful
individuals.
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Dan Fenn pointed out that individuals create certain
outcomes. Many of the interviewees depicted individual
participant's styles and choices as crucial factors
determining the course of events. Leaders like Stephen
Coyle and Steve Smith were often characterized as dictating
events. One observer said about John Prescott: "Prescott
came from Marineland in San Diego. Prescott is central... he
wants to make the world's greatest Aquarium - a tremendous
ambition to do something great ."
Certainly, leaders can create a long-term vision and a
climate for negotiation. But if powerful individuals are the
most important factor in determining siting outcomes, why
didn't they get their way in these two cases?
Especially because they work in non-profit institutions,
these entrepreneurial leaders have a more limited repertoire
of options for taking risks necessary to fulfill their
visions. Not only must they cope with stringent governmental
restrictions on their activities, but they are less flexible
in shifting their institution's financial resources into new
ventures. Leaders in a private firm can more easily "select
market niches that allow them to avoid heavy governmental
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entanglement. "6  Not having this flexibility, leaders of
non-profit institutions are more dependent on the generosity
of donors. The vision of a charismatic, entrepeneurial
leader like John Prescott is bounded by these limitations.
Furthermore, organizations like the BRA, Aquarium and
Kennedy Library Corporation are not monolithic institutions
following the dictates of one person. Many subgroups,
inside and outside of the organization, promote
contradictory views of what the organization should
produce.7 Such tension within the BRA was reported by
Kathryn Downing. BRA staff had diverse ideas about which
options were best concerning the Dry Dock #2 proposal.
Indeed, moles within the BRA actually lent valuable
assistance to the efforts of the Ad Hoc Coalition's efforts.
Clearly, the "individual as decision-maker" theory isn't
sufficient to explain the similar outcome of the two cases.
6Dennis Young, "Executive Leadership in Nonprofit
Organizations" in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook,
Walter W. Powell, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987),
p. 177.
Rosabeth Moss Kanter and David V. Summers, "Doing Well
while Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in
Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency
Approach," in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Walter
W. Powell, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 137.
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2. NON-PROFITS ARE INEXPERIENCED AND SOMETIMES AMBIVALENT
ABOUT PLANNING REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
Some interviewees claimed that these institutions, in
particular the Aquarium, simply didn't have the capacity to
be real estate developers.
Siting facilities entails unpredictable costs for any
developer. Non-profit institutions, in particular, are often
neither capable nor willing to enter the risky waters of
real estate development. Non-profits are not internally
self-sufficient because their options for shifting resources
are more limited than those of private-sector firms. As a
result, they are less capable of using debt financing to
fund real-estate development, and become dependent on key
funding sources and the good will of the public for
financial support.' Both the Kennedy Library and Aquarium
could proceed with their plans only after receiving
donations of property.
Furthermore, because they must pay careful attention to
8 Walter W. Powell and Rebecca Friedkin, "Organizational
Change in Nonprofit Organizations" in The Nonprofit Sector: A
Research Handbook, Walter Powell, ed., op. cit., p. 183.
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cultivating their image as socially responsible
organizations to ensure this stream of support,'
organizations like the Aquarium and Library are less likely
to resort to litigation to pursue their real estate
ambitions because of potential damage to their public
persona as a "good" institution.
Bill Whitney, planner at the Aquarium, explains the
institution's limitations this way: "The Aquarium is very
good at what it knows but isn't very good at doing what they
don't know how to do. It's a hard thing - as much as you
want this to be a museum... it's not a down and dirty
development nor is it a noble institution whom everybody
loves. The Aquarium needs to be more sanguine about all
that, understand we are a developer."
In addition, there are often tensions within non-profit
organizations concerning priorities: should scarce resources
be dedicated toward the mission to serve the public (and
which public?) or toward institutional growth? These
9Dennis Young, "Executive Leadership in Nonprofit
Organizations" in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook,
Walter W. Powell, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987),
p. 177.
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tensions make it more likely that such organizations will be
ambivalent about acting in the role of developer.
Moreover, Middleton notes that a high-status, non-profit
board like the Aquarium's offers such important social
benefits to its members that they are loath to disrupt their
relationships with each other by tackling controversial
issues, like a public conflict over siting a new facility.
"It appears that the board structure of many of the most
enduring and stable organizations leads them to emphasize
the status quo."10
One observer of the Aquarium confirms these theoretical
speculations in this description of its Board: "The Aquarium
is not a private corporation with merger and acquisitions
[departments]. Even internally there was some opposition to
expansion on the Board, members who don't want change and
think things now are fine. They're on the Board for all
sorts of reasons. People are stakeholders, not
shareholders. They do what they can."
1 Melissa Middleton, "Nonprofit Boards of Directors: Beyond
the Governance Function", in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research
Handbook, Walter Powell, ed., op. cit., p. 147.
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Such internal frictions make it less likely that the
organization will have the combined skill and drive required
to make a real estate deal of the kind attempted at Dry Dock
#2 in Charlestown.
That the Aquarium, in particular, experienced difficulty
transforming itself from a beloved non-profit organization
into a developer is predictable; this factor significantly
affected the outcome of that case.
The Kennedy Library Corporation was also bound by the
difficulty of reconciling its entrepeneurial goals with its
social mission, only from a slightly different angle.
Another trap for non-profits is that they tend to believe so
strongly in their mission that "failure to achieve goals is
taken not as a sign of weakness in the organization but as a
sign that efforts should be intensified."" The sort of
gritty, can-do attitude of Libary Corporation leaders
described by John Stewart suggests that the obstacles
blocking them actually reinforced their determination to
" Rosabeth Kanter and David V. Summers, "Doing Well While
Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit
Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency Approach,"
in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Walter W. Powell,
ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 164.
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forge ahead, despite clear signals that they should
reevaluate.
Harvard University, in contrast, is an experienced
developer. Yet it was also constrained by its need to be
perceived as a good neighbor by abutters, since its home is
in Cambridge.
3. THE RATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF TRUST BREAKS DOWN DURING
DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES, INCREASING THE POTENTIAL FOR
CONFLICT.
Conflicts such as these involve large sets of players
working within complex institutions operating according to
standard procedures. Such procedures often function poorly
in times of conflict. "Particularly critical (situations)
that typically do not have 'standard' characteristics are
often handled sluggishly or inappropriately. " 2  As a
result, the potential for mistrust is reinforced.
In both cases, participants described their feeling of not
12 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971),
p. 89.
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really being listened to, not knowing how to initiate
conversations, never being clear about what the other side
actually needed. Throughout these two cases, individuals
often blamed each other's arrogance for damaging
communication when negotiations were arduous. Perhaps, the
more profound problem was to create better internal
guidelines for resolving crisis.
Because the Task Force and Council formats failed to
successfully resolve smaller, earlier conflicts, breakdowns
occurred over the Aquarium. David Pacifaro, a consultant to
the Aquarium, dispassionately describes how trust dissolved
and led to the controversy at Dry Dock #2. "In a
feasibility study you need trust built up to say 'I don't
have answers now. Therefore we need to work together, a
leap of faith.' The leap of faith never occurred because the
group [the Council Planning and Zoning Committee] felt
they'd been burned on the master plan by the BRA. They [the
Committee] thought the BRA had betrayed them on the master
plan in May, '88 - that's in terms of bringing the Aquarium
in, among other things. 'You knew about the Aquarium and let
us pass it [the master plan] even though you knew it [the
plan] would be junked?'" Early conflict over smaller issues
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led to a breakdown which the Council was not capable of
mending, in part, because the various parties lacked that
capability.
Allies in a project can also lose trust with one another.
Although the National Park Service supported the Aquarium
proposal, Peter Steele became disenchanted with the
principle sponsors because they simply failed to communicate
their intentions in a timely fashion. "The vote was in
favor of #2 but the BRA and Aquarium -without notifying us -
said 'we can't go to #2.' Then their [the Aquarium and BRA)
story changed regarding #5, 'we'll go to #5'. . . which they
had previously said was impossible. The ending left a sour
taste to those of us who were supportive. They walked away
from #2 ... not even a word to us. And we'd spent money,
time, energy on this." Why weren't the BRA and Aquarium
organizations more effective in maintaining communication
with the Park Service? One reason could be that, given the
crisis, their internal processes broke down and were unable
to cover all the important bases.
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Non-profit organizations provide services which are
intangible and hard to measure," whereas firms in the
private sector can more easily measure success by the level
of profit achieved. Thus, given such ambiguous operating
objectives, non-profits experience a loose coupling between
official mission and operative goals. As a result, rational
planning in non-profits can be quite difficult and "signals
indicating unacceptable goals are less effective and take
longer to come."14  Given this built-in inefficiency in the
standard operating procedures of organizations, non-profits
like the Library Corporation or Aquarium might have more
difficulty finding their way out of particularly critical
situations during conflicts over siting facilities.
Ted Musho, architect with I. M. Pei, reflects on the
inadequacy of normal procedures when issues have become
intensely controversial. "I was a professional so couldn't
really be an advocate. There was such baiting - it was a
13 Rosabeth Moss Kanter and David V. Summers, "Doing Well
while Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in
Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency
Approach," in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Walter
W. Powell, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p.
163.
14 Ibid. p. 163.
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part of the problem...no leap of faith, always adversarial.
Smith's [President of the Library Corporation] presentation
during the EIS was well-primed, rehearsed. But the
situation was always confrontational. We do more studies to
understand what we're doing than anybody could imagine.
That's how Mr. Pei is."
Taken alone, however, technical studies cannot substitute
for astute management of conflict during siting
controversies. The procedures of the large institutions did
not sufficiently direct a way out of crisis. For instance,
the Aquarium claimed it was either Dry Dock #2, or nothing,
a tactic which Bill Whitney described as an "egocentric
attitude about being sure of things." The Ad Hoc Coalition
seemed to work more efficiently. Even though some of its
members opposed any plan for an Aquarium in the Navy Yard,
the Coalition compromised among themselves to present an
alternative option - the site at Dry Dock #5 - to sponsors
of the Aquarium. Perhaps the Coalition's smaller size and
narrow focus enabled it to deal more flexibly with conflict
than the large institutions.
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4. BAD OUTCOMES OCCUR BECAUSE PROFESSIONALS AND LAYPEOPLE
DISTRUST EACH OTHER AND MAKE DECISIONS DIFFERENTLY.
Professionals are involved in creative and technical
operations that are incompatible with the demands and
process of working with communities.
Michael O'Hare theorizes about why distrust exists between
communities and professionals, and scolds both groups.
"People have withdrawn authority from experts and
government. The reason is not that technocrats are wrong-
headed or hold illegitimate values or serve an oppressor
class, but that we [technocrats] haven't been doing our job.
Answering the wrong questions, and multiplying the wrong
numbers, analysts, facility developers, and even opponents
have consistently looked in the wrong places."" In
Charlestown and Cambridge, laypeople have traditionally been
distrustful of expert opinion. Where do experts and
laypeople look when seeking such anwers?
is Michael O'Hare, "Risk Anticipation As a Social Cost,"
(Cambridge: an unpublished paper presented at the Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy Roundtable, August 1989), p. 2.
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Perhaps citizens and experts have clashing work styles and
define their missions quite differently. On the level of
simply managing time, it's difficult for public forums like
the Council to mesh the schedules and styles of laypeople
and professionals. Architects and laypeople work according
to different rhythms. Dan Fenn describes how conflict
results from this difference. "I.M. Pei doesn't want someone
screwing around with his plan. I objected to the pyramid.
They [Pei's firm] said, 'it's too late. We have to push the
model as is.' It's [architecture] a creative process. You
write until the night before and there's an unfolding
internally, even if Pei were disposed to negotiate with the
community. The process by which these things get negotiated
goes against that."
In addition, there are always some professionals and
citizens who are such true believers in their own
viewpoints, that they don't look towards compromise as a
place for answers. Musho expresses his perspective as an
architect: "To do a piece of architecture is a love affair.
The architect is by definition self-serving, and you can't
overcome that dilemma with the community."
207
Furthermore, some professionals believe that laypeople
overestimate their own expertise, rendering the process
inefficient. Linda Smith suggests that: "Flagship Wharf [a
condominium development in the Navy Yard] operated on a very
narrow margin of profit. They [the neighborhood] don't
understand or choose to understand the economics. The work
on the master plan allowed a group of people to be
architects without any education or understanding about the
technical aspects."
Some community participants, on the other hand, believe that
professionals performed poorly in designing the building
Smith mentions. The Council format actually encourages
laypeople to contribute to decisions despite their lack of
specialized training. And residents can be just as
insistent as professionals about the correctness of their
own opinions: after all, they consider it "their"
neighborhood. Council member Kate McDonough says, "I
remember being angry with the BRA and Aquarium who wanted to
see it happen in #2 and laughed at #5 as an idea."
Bassim Halabi from the BRA believes that the conflict
between laypeople and professional staff always exists:
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"You're [the professional] always in default. You have to
be very careful to make clear it's not final, you're
sharing. They sometimes ask, 'why weren't we included from
the start?' But when is the beginning?"
Halabi implies that professionals and laypeople typically
have difficulty achieving a happy collaboration, a problem
built into the complexity of their mutual task. This gulf
between the two groups is an important factor contributing
to the similar outcome of such cases.
5. BOTH CASES HAD SIMILAR OUTCOMES BECAUSE OF THE
INCAPACITY OF THE INSTITUTIONS TO CORRECTLY ASSESS COMMUNITY
INPUT ABOUT THE PROJECTS.
Institutions and residents lacked necessary information
about each other, leading to misunderstanding and conflict.
Some interviewees suggested that conflicts arose because
technical aspects of the project were not effectively
presented and residents didn't have adequate information for
making a "better" decision. Ted Musho says: "we didn't make
a large enough context model [a model of the site within the
209
neighborhood]. 'let's look at this in context.' [as it
relates to a much larger geographical area]."
Pacifaro, consultant to the Aquarium, claims that the
Aquarium had not developed the technical data which the
community wanted to have regarding Dry Dock #2 because the
process was in such an early stage. "The Aquarium was
saying, 'we want your ok to study this site.' The opponents
were saying [during the debate on Dry Dock #2], 'Nothing
till you guarantee me the outcomes will be ok.' We
[Aquarium sponsors] can't go in with immature proposals to
mature questions. Now, the proposal [Dry Dock #5/Parcel 5]
has flesh on its bones - traffic count, number of visitors,
water shuttle routes, costs, sources of money, footprint."
He maintains that community demands for precise information
were out of synch with what sponsors were capable of
producing. In both cases, proponents and opponents disagreed
about whether sponsors were incapable or unwilling to
produce data.
In addition to the difficulty of appropriately sequencing
information, non-profit developers can easily misinterpret
how local communities perceive the costs of accepting their
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proposals. The likelihood of this misinterpretation
increases when the plan is greeted by an initial blast of
public and media enthusiasm, and when the proposed facility
is an amenity that pleases a broad geographical reach of
people.
It is no guarantee that a proposed facility will be accepted
even if diffuse benefits exceed local costs." One could
stretch that idea: the community may harbor good will
towards a non-profit institution that fosters widely
diffused benefits; but that goodwill may not necessarily
convey local acceptance of the costs of development. In the
Kennedy Library and Aquarium cases, the non-profit
institutions confused the community's goodwill for approval
of the development. Saundra Graham, from RCCC describes the
dynamic: "John Kennedy was well liked and going against him
was like going against the most popular President in our
times. But going against that and living with [the Library]
are two different things. We love Kennedy. We were 'anti'
that kind of development." David Pacifaro shared an
identical insight about the Aquarium case: "It's damn near
impossible to transfer this goodwill to a development
1 O'Hare, Bacow, and Sanderson. op. cit., p. 68.
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project and have that goodwill carry the day. Everybody
loves the Aquarium. The members of the AD Hoc Coalition are
fans of the- Aquarium but not Aquarium development fans."
Accurately assessing these costs and benefits, and
determining exactly whom to satisfy, is a difficult task for
non-profits juggling demands from both local residents and a
more distant constituency. Chuck Daly, Vice-President of
Harvard University, expressed how perplexed he was in
attempting that calculation. "If you'd cast it [the Library
proposal] to a vote to the people of Cambridge, it [the vote
in favor] would have been a landslide. How wide should the
community be? Just the neighbors? We listened to all the
players but the 80% to 90% of Cambridge that supported the
Library were difficult to mobilize. People have to make a
living -they don't have the time [to be active on these
issues)."
What Daley and other sponsors didn't understand is that
abutters believe that their per capita costs will be great
if the facility is sited; whereas more numerous, scattered
supporters perceive that their per capita benefit will not
be so significant. Therefore, it is often easier for
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opponents to mobilize popular resistance among abutters
against a facility than it is for sponsors to mobilize
support from allies who are geographically widely
distributed. Supporters of proposals who live in a distant
suburb look at powerful institutions like Harvard University
and the Aquarium and say, "I like the idea of a new Aquarium
at that site. But I have more important issues closer to
home. Let them take care of it. They can handle it. "
6. CASES LIKE THIS END IN CLASS CONFLICT LEADING TO
DECISIONS UNDESIRED BY EITHER SIDE.
Opponents criticized each other on the basis of perceived
class distinctions.
In these two cases, many interviewees suggested that the
conflict was rooted in class differences; curiously, though,
the different coalitions supporting and opposing the
facilities were fairly heterogeneous in terms of class.
The upper-middle class received the most bashing. Richard
Neustadt belittled Neighborhood Ten resistance to the
Library: "it was an "upper-middle class thing. Too many
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tourists and swelling congestion. 'keep the hoi polloi out
of here.' It rallied enough people on Brattle Street to
involve the courts." Dan Fenn also chided Library opponents
in a similar class-critical way: "You [the sponsors of the
Library] deal with a station wagon set. For them, this is
the only thing [resisting the Library] they're doing. They
have access, they're sophisticated and wealthy, committed,
and single-minded."
Saundra Graham also takes a shot at upper-middle class
participants, only in her view they are supporters of
development like the Library. "Harvard Square has changed.
It's filled with Phds and architects and consultants and
it's a shopping mall for their lifestyle. It's no longer an
all-kinds of people community. When I was a kid, you knew
who lived next door. But now you have a bunch of
individuals who don't want to be bothered. You need a PHD
to get into the door for jobs. A neighborhood person gets a
job as a maid or janitor or a word processor."
The Ad Hoc Coalition was criticized for being elitist and
for using scare tactics to involve public housing tenants.
Kathryn Downing acknowledges that "we were called a bunch of
214
elitists and were successfully discredited in the beginning.
But we succeeded in developing a broad range of supporters."
She, in turn, aims the class argument at trustees of the
Aquarium, pointing out that the Aquarium rejected the
Neighborhood Council's proposal to seat Charlestown
residents on their Board. "It's also a cultural thing- the
Board of Directors [of the Aquarium] are from Weston and
Wellsley and felt entitled to tell Charlestown what to do:
'this is what you need.' So a full-blown plan was visited
upon us. Earlier, the Council had proposed that the Aquarium
have three trustees from Charlestown to combat the fact the
trustees were from out of town. The Aquarium board didn't
want to agree to that.... Today, we have Paul Barrett [from
the BRA working on the project] from South Boston. He knows
how Charlestown works and has political clout the others
didn't. He has more class affiliation with Charlestown."
Barrett is better to negotiate with, according to Downing,
because he can grasp from experience what concerns
Charlestown residents and speak languages that both Townies
and Aquarium trustees understand.
Few interviewees felt comfortable criticizing the foibles of
working-class participants in the conflicts. One respondent
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said about working-class opponents of the Library, "if it
weren't for Harvard being nearby, Cambridge would be like
Somerville - nothing would be there [except a working-class
suburb]." He also roundly criticized those he considered
upper-middle class opponents of the Library, as well. One
person told me about opponents to the Aquarium in
Charlestown: "Working-class Irish love to fight with each
other. That's what they do... I should know, I'm Irish,
myself." None of them wanted their comments to be on the
public record.
In both cases, the initial opponents to the facilities were
middle-class residents who later formed coalitions with
working-class people. This fact belies the observation of
theorists like Robert Q. Wilson who has hypothesized that
upper-middle class residents are more likely to support
urban renewal because they "think of the community as a
whole and long term benefits even when that might involve
immediate costs to themselves."" In these cases, middle-
class residents actually opposed development that some
17 James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen
Participation in Urban Renewal," Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, Vol. XXIX, No. 4 (November 1963), p. 247
in Langley Carleton Keyes, Jr., The Rehabilitation Planning Game
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969) p. 9.
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working-class residents considered an amenity. Although it
was not possible to line people up according to class on the
issue of the Library or Aquarium, participants still used
class arguments, perhaps because it's a traditional currency
of political struggle in Cambridge and Charlestown.
7. COMPETITION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN LEADS TO A FUNDAMENTAL
CONFLICT ABOUT PRIORITIES IN SITING CASES.
In these two cases, opposition often started among a group
of women alarmed that their neighborhood might become
unsuitable for family life. On the other side were men
directing large institutions, who believed they understood
what decisions were best.
Some interviewees made pejorative statements about how "men"
or "women" were involved in the siting conflict, comments
like these: "uneducated women with kids out of wedlock are
trying to tell me what to do!" And "these guys think they
can push us 'little women' around!" Most interviewees,
mainly men, requested that I keep such comments
confidential, clearly indicating that they don't want to be
held publicly responsible for such opinions.
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Underneath these gender attacks, I perceived that conflict
over these facilities resulted from two perspectives about
how to plan a community. The large institutions were guided
by men directing technically proficient, bureaucratic, top-
down organizations. Their goal was global: to create a
"world-class" facility and create benefits for Boston. In
opposition was an informal, spontaneous, neighborhood-based
group often led by women who knew what they wanted from a
street-level perspective: for example, nice parks for their
children, good schools and public services, not too much
traffic, clean light and air. Martha A. Ackelsberg
describes how women become activists in a way that is
apropos: "Many women who become activists on the local scene
do so not because they have been called out by unions, by
political parties, or even by formally structured community
organizations. Instead, they respond to the issues which
come before them as members of households and, importantly,
of the communities in which those households are embedded." 18
Kathryn Downing described this perspective about planning
and how she feels development can be accomplished. "You talk
18 Martha A. Ackelsberg, "Women's Collaborative Activities
and City Life: Politics and Policy," in Political Women, Janet A.
Flammang, ed., (New York: Sage Publications, 1984) p. 255.
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about building concrete and brick projects but you need to
engage in another dialogue. [Downing then describes a public
planning process she believes is a good model] The
traditional community wanted affordable housing. Breeds
Hill [an area where newcomers who are preservationists, many
of them women, live] wanted good design. The new housing on
Main Street is a sensitive treatment. We went door to door
to get what people wanted to see and discovered they wanted:
off-street parking, mixed family housing and private yards."
In this case, union members, mainly men, shared leadership
with preservationists, many of them women, in working on the
Main Street Housing. The results of the collaboration,
according to Downing, were successful.
She points to the presence of grassroots women's activism
elsewhere in the Boston area. She attended the same law
school as a woman who led opposition to the Kennedy Library;
they were inspired by similar political influences. Another
woman who lives in the North End has been an important
leader in monitoring the Aquarium' s plans for expansion on
the waterfront. Downing says these women share a common
vision about planning which often sets them in opposition to
the big institutions. I wonder how these activists would
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negotiate a conflict in which their communities were at
odds.
8. ANY FLAWS IN THE PROCESS ARE MAGNIFIED BY TIME AND COST
PRESSURES AND MAKE ACHIEVING A HARMONIOUS OUTCOME DIFFICULT
The internal process is difficult to manage because so many
external factors which influence options are in flux, for
example, the changing real estate market, the skills and
needs of new participants, and political and bureaucratic
shifts of policy.
Decisions being deliberated by the Council often move out of
the control of planners and citizens. BRA planner Victor
Karen says, "You can't say in six months what will be easier
to give up - because of other things changing. For example,
we initially looked at #5 as a dry dock only. Then with
more land [Parcel 5], siting the Aquarium becomes a
different problem. We own the land and [the] Raymond
[Group] has development rights. We'll have to get the
Aquarium, Massachusetts General Hospital and the Raymond
Group satisfied. It will be a complicated financial deal to
accomplish."
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Non-profit developers depend on public support to develop
their facilities. But that support can dwindle rapidly.
About the mood of the public concerning the Kennedy Library,
Richard Neustadt said, "if it had been possible to move fast
it would have happened within the mood of elegy for JFK."
Also, changing regulations which increase the costs of
development are another wild card which can provide an
additional wedge for opponents to create expensive delay.
Goyette says that the Library case happened "at a time of
burgeoning rules and regulations, legislation dealing with
environmental impact. Every year there would be new
guidelines. With very little money they (opponents] could
keep throwing up roadblocks. After the EIS, the Kennedy
Library Corporation just said, 'the hell with it' and pulled
out. They would have won in court; but, worried about
money, they [the Library Corporation] decided to pull out
and avoid two or three years of litigation."
Opponents to facilities are sophisticated about using the
pressures of time and cost to stop sitings. In the Aquarium
case, opponents understood well that if they lost in the
Council forum, it was possible to delay the project in one
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of over sixty other review processes: that by delaying the
process, they could kill the project. It turns out to be
just as easy to do this within a formalized process as in an
ad hoc process.
All of these factors combine to drive a facility siting
process towards a greater likelihood of breaking down, no
matter how citizen review is structured. Indeed, as I've
pointed out, some theorists suggest that measures to
increase citizen participation have actually accentuated the
problems of facility siting. Moreover, the fragile
relationship between non-profit institutions and the public
makes it especially difficult for them to perform
effectively as developers. If participants in the siting
process were aware of these sources of conflict, then it
might be easier to anticipate them and deal with issues more
effectively. What do the theories I've discussed suggest
about how the siting process could be changed?
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CHAPTER SIX
SUGGESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE FACILITY SITING PROCESS
Conflicts between opponents and sponsors of facilities
commonly occur in such siting cases, despite the best
intentions of participants. Non-profit institutions siting
new facilities, even those considered amenities, are not
exempt from conflicts with local residents. I suggested in
Chapter Five that such cases present special conundrums.
How can siting processes be improved? First, let us consider
generic siting controversies. Susskind, Andrews, and O'Hare,
Bacow and Sanderson suggest deep, structural interventions
which require changing institutional relationships and
customary ways of behaving.
A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
1. According to Susskind, routine forms of citizen
participation like the Task Force or Council often lead to
deadlock of the kind in the Library and Aquarium case. He
suggests that professionals must create theories of
bargaining that transform typical debate into "occasions to
help residents 'get better' at community problem-solving or
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collective decision-making... as opportunities to build the
capacity of contending groups to work together more
effectively."'
How to re-socialize participants? Susskind believes that
"any and all groups and individuals willing to persist
throughout the process" ought to participate and "be given a
substantial, if not deciding, role in the bargaining
process." 2 Instead of ritualized voting and formal rules, a
process of working together should be developed by the
group. Straw votes, for instance, indicate preferences but
don't lock participants into positions. This theorist also
advocates the use of charettes, brainstorming sessions, role
playing, and collective image building. The result will be
an agreement that everyone has collectively created and
forms the basis for a similar process on future projects.
However, there are nagging problems with achieving the
process he suggests. Susskind acknowledges that it is
difficult to motivate all interested groups, including
'Lawrence Susskind, The Importance Of Citizen Participation
and Consensus-Building in the Land Use Planning Process
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute Land Use Institute Symposium,
M.I.T., October 1977) p. 31.
2 Ibid. p. 40.
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elected officials, to participate in this process and abide
by such negotiations. In addition, who would pay for the
process?
2. Richard Andrews says that in a typical siting case,
developers complete a risk assessment of negative impacts
and then try to mitigate the impacts or compensate the local
community for costs due to the impacts. Andrews suggests
that "framing in terms of risk may be going down the wrong
track."3  Rather, Andrews suggests, "we should aim toward
positive visions of the future we are trying to get
to.. .attractive options for how we will invent the future of
human-environment relationships. "
Clearly, the BRA and Aquarium tried to paint a very positive
image of the future at Dry Dock #2. However, they discovered
that concerns like "loss of autonomy" are not fungible. The
Ad Hoc Coalition refused to believe that another park in the
Navy Yard could adequately replace Shipyard Park, a place
which had the kind of symbolic and emotional value that
3 David Laws, "Case Studies and Questions," (October 27,
1989), in an unpublished notes from discussions at The National
Workshop on Facility Siting, p. 3.
4 Ibid. p. 3.
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Andrews describes.
3. O'Hare, Bacow, and Sanderson suggest that a more formal
process be created whereby communities receive compensation
for development impacts. Facilities would be "'auctioned'
off to the one community among several candidates whose bid
for compensation, added to construction and operation costs
on that site, gives the lowest costs for the project."5
However some communities which would be technically superior
sites for certain facilities might not have the staffing and
financial resources to participate in an auction.
OTHER GUIDELINES, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO NON-PROFIT
DEVELOPERS SITING AMENITIES
The suggestions above are valuable contributions toward
improving the siting process. I also see more modest steps
that developers and residents can take to avoid conflict.
The following guidelines have been developed from my
research and analysis of the two cases. I address my
comments first to project proponents outside the local
5 Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson,
Facility Siting and Public Opposition (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Company, 1983), p. 84.
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community, including the developer-institutions and
sponsoring city agencies; then to community residents.
Although all of these guidelines are intended to be useful
to participants in any siting facility process, certain ones
are especially germane for non-profit organizations acting
as entrepreneurial developers.
TO PROPONENTS OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY
1. Learn about the history of development in the community
where you plan to site a facility to better understand
people's expectations and behavior.
Members of the community see your effort as one of a series
of development events on their turf. Research on what has
gone on in the past is a good forecast of what to expect
from residents today. For instance, the Aquarium proposal
met similar resistance in public meetings from an organized
minority that urban renewal faced in the mid-60s. David
Pacifaro, consultant to the Aquarium from Northeast
Management, says the Aquarium underestimated "how quickly
and effectively the AD Hoc group organized without money.
On a daily basis they garnered new members. The cause was
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an emotional quality of life issue which brought people out
of the woodwork into overnight activism." Yet, this activism
is certainly not uncharacteristic of Charlestown residents:
a fervent "people's" organization fights to derail the
intentions of powerful institutions.
I believe that if these developers had more carefully
studied the history of development in those areas, they
would have been better prepared to act appropriately before
conflict occurred. Learning this history requires walking
around in the neighborhoods of the community, looking at
past development, and really listening to what residents say
about antecedent experiences and current needs.
Learning from history cuts across boundaries of geography,
as well as time. The New England Aquarium could have
studied the Kennedy Library case in Cambridge as a means of
better understanding how to proceed in the Navy Yard.
2. Don't confuse support in the community for the good
works of the non-profit institution with endorsement of
development plans.
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The Aquarium is a popular Boston cultural/educational
institution. John F. Kennedy was a popular President whom
many Cantabridgians wanted to memorialize. Both
developments were greeted with enthusiasm until residents
started to think more carefully about potential costs. Non-
profit developers, in particular, can be "true believers"
about their mission. Sometimes the public's general good
will towards an institution skews a "true believer's"
perception of the extent of civic support for a specific
project. That the facility is an amenity also encourages
developers to believe their proposal will receive the local
community's support.
A related issue is how non-profits view themselves. I
suggested in Chapter 5 that incongruities between a non-
profit's social and entrepreneurial missions can lead to
problems in sorting out signals about their own performance.
Kanter and Summers suggest that non-profit institutions have
many constituencies and must develop appropriate standards
for measuring performance which take these diverse groups
into account. By framing the expectations of the local
community, the broader public, donors, trustees and staff,
such standards would clarify how a non-profit could best
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achieve the delicate task of doing good and developing a new
facility .
3. Consider carefully the effect of dramatic public
announcements about plans on the attitudes of the local host
community.
Because non-profit institutions are especially dependent on
donors for contributions, well-timed and executed public
announcements about siting proposals are important tools in
gaining public support; a misstep can seriously jeopardize
fundraising efforts.
The Kennedy Library and Aquarium successfully gained
attention from a broad constituency by effectively using the
media to announce plans. However, another crucial public
relations effort has to concentrate on winning the support
of nearby abutters. Local residents will feel alienated if
not brought into the process at an early stage, especially
if a public announcement is made without the community's
prior knowledge and involvement. Local apprehensions often
increase in direct proportion to the specificity of design
proposals in the announcement, which was true about Pei's
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original design.
Yet, an announcement that is too ambiguous can also
encourage rumors: some residents in, Charlestown were
frustrated because they felt they could not get enough
information about the Aquarium design at Dry Dock #2. It
is a difficult balance to strike. Therefore, having
substantive input from a cross-section of a community will
help shape how information is shared with the public.
4. Be prepared for a neighborhood review process much more
complex than just a technical procedure for studying and
commenting on plans.
The siting issue is only part of a community council's
intent. The community empowerment aspect of citizen review
can give the process a significance which is not necessarily
included in the developer's agenda and can affect the
emotional tone of negotiation. Personal and political
rivalries also influence debate about siting and can slow
the process down considerably. Furthermore, there may be
disagreement in the group about goals, whether the task is
to invent a linkage package or to comment in depth on design
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and technical plans. Finally, council members are
volunteers and might not be able to work at the pace or on
the schedule which professionals expect.
How the citizen group is composed is another factor. If
members are elected, it is more likely that the forum will
be a political entity where individuals are competing to
support positions they perceive are the in the best
interests of a particular group.
5. Be prepared for the difficulty of predicting exactly how
residents will react to the economic aspects of development,
whether they'll feel their economic well-being is threatened
or improved.
If the proposed facility is 'noxious', it is more likely
that local residents will oppose it. If the facility is an
amenity proposed by a non-profit institution, then the task
of assessing how the local community will calculate costs
and benefits becomes much more complex.
Nancy Keyes says about the Navy Yard: "initially you'd
think newcomers would want development to build up their own
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investment. Members of the Ad Hoc Coalition bought prime
pieces of property. But they're opposed [to the Aquarium] ."
Anticipation of changed property values and volume of
commercial business is only part of the bundle of
calculations residents ponder when thinking about a new
neighbor. Other variables include the kind of benefits from
linkage as well as impacts on traffic density, open space,
and historic preservation.
Although the developer may offer what appears to be
effective mitigation or equitable compensation, opponents to
a facility often do not feel that what they are protecting
has a "price" and can be bartered. It is best to prepare for
a dialogue where people talk about social values as well as
economic costs and benefits.
6. If possible, invite community members to participate in
workshops on design-making.
Residents know their neighborhood well and can give
excellent suggestions about problems with the site and what
design is appropriate. In a siting case involving public
land and a facility which will be used by the public,
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advocating a design which is a "tour de force" will be more
difficult unless public participation is meaningful. If
possible, use both static renderings and more advanced
technological tools - video or computer rendering - to
demonstrate what the facility will look like at the site and
within the larger physical context of the community.
Technical data about the impact of design is best supplied
by an impartial expert appointed by both community and
developer, so there can be no question of bias and residents
have an opportunity to seek information they think is
important.
7. Prepare for the "worst case scenario" by realizing that
there are other opportunities which may open up if this
location is unavailable.
Try to avoid getting addicted to the idea of one particular
site as being the only option because it appears to be the
best. Other sites which seem less attractive actually offer
advantages over the "best" site when one takes a closer
view. In both cases, sponsors of facilities told me that
the new sites - Columbia Point in Dorchester and Dry Dock
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#5/Parcel 5 in the Navy Yard offered opportunities which
only became clear after deeper study.
TO RESIDENTS
1. Share the history of your community with facility
developers and sponsors.
Drive and walk with them around the community, in the site
where they want to build the facility and in adjacent
neighborhoods so they can get a more complete sense of the
area. Share an oral, written, and photographic history of
how the community dealt with other development issues in the
past.
2. Understand that although the institutions you're dealing
with may have big budgets and a professional staff, it may
be inexperienced with the process of siting a facility in
your community. Make it clear from the beginning that
colorful brochures and public relations events are less
important than substantive conversations about important
issues.
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3. The citizen advisory group/neighborhood council and
developers should create a procedure for discussing the
content of upcoming public announcements about the facility
and its potential effects on attitudes in the local
community.
4. Members of a community council should arrive at a clear
understanding with each other and the community about
expectations of the tasks and authority of the council.
Is the council primarily involved with bargaining for
linkage benefits? Are members expected to make substantive
contributions about design and technical decisions? Does
the citizen group have the means to implement its decisions?
Not getting consistent answers about those questions will
confuse participants. If residents believe the council
needs more authority to make meaningful decisions about
development, political leadership needs to be involved in
clarifying such issues.
5. Understand constraints on developers and that benefits
from development your community expected six months ago may
be an inappropriate expectation today.
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Today the Boston real estate market is not booming as it was
a few years ago when residents received linkage in addition
to traditional benefits derived from development, like jobs
and tax revenue. A local community's expectations about
benefits were set by earlier precedent: sometimes there is a
lag between these expectations and what developers can
currently afford.
6. Work out a way to collaborate with professionals who can
share expertise regarding legal, architectural, and
technical issues where you feel limited.
In this society architects are often regarded as artists,
creating an individualistic ouevre which the public usually
responds to after the concept has been completed. This
order of doing things can lead to conflict. On the other
hand, architecture can be more than just be an imitation of
past designs. If you are a resident, encourage the
neighborhood council to sponsor a process where residents
can interact productively with architects and planners
before the concept for a site has been completed.
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Also insist on having input about which neutral expert
should be selected to gather and analyze technical data
concerning traffic, for instance. You will be able to more
easily direct their efforts and trust the information they
provide.
7. The demoralization costs of long-term conflict are
great. To avoid protracted polarized conflict consider
reasonable alternatives to offer proponents (and opponents)
of the facility.
Developers sometimes offer compensation to local opponents
to ameliorate social costs. Residents opposing siting an
amenity at a proposed location can also offer reasonable
alternatives as compensation to developers so that
participants don't find themselves in an "all or nothing"
situation. They may be willing to compromise if the site is
at another nearby location or if the size of the original
plan is reduced. Groups like a neighborhood council can work
with the loyal opposition to discover these trade-offs. In
the case of the Aquarium, developers decided, short of
litigation, to pursue a nearby alternative, Dry Dock
#5/Parcel 5. In the case of the Kennedy Library, developers
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found a solution which they preferred over adjudication or
alternatives of opponents.
Residents who are divided by a siting controversy will still
be neighbors whether or not that facility is ever built.
Such relationships can be permanently damaged by actions
taken in the heat of debate, and the whole community could
suffer as a result.
CONCLUSION
One might assume that negotiations with a local community
about siting an amenity would be an easier task than siting
a noxious facility. However, as I've demonstrated, typical
siting conflicts still rise to the surface; indeed, that the
facility is perceived as an attractive amenity with some
adverse impacts can cloud calculations which sponsors and
community make about the potential costs and benefits of
locating the facility at that site.
These two facility siting cases also underline the special
dilemma confronting non-profit institutions trying to
balance social and entrepreneurial missions. Combined with
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conflicts characteristically inherent in siting facilities,
the ambivalence of non-profit institutions about performing
in the role of developer can outweigh efforts to more
formally integrate citizen participation in the siting
process.
If non-profit institutions must act more and more as
entrepreneurs to earn revenue, as I've suggested, then their
already sensitive relationship with their public and local
communities will become more complex. It remains to be seen
if that phenomenon, combined with the growing movement for
community participation in making decisions about
development issues, will compel non-profit institutions,
city agencies, and community activists to better clarify
their relationships and invent improved strategies for
negotiating more efficient and equitable outcomes to siting
disputes.
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